

THE **FIREARMS** INSTRUCTOR


The Official Publication of The International Association of Law Enforcement Firearms Instructors®



Featuring articles by:

Tim Bane ○ Mike Baum ○ John Combs ○ Colin Despins
Eric Dickinson ○ Lou Ann Hamblin ○ Tom Hausner ○ Christopher Helm
Howard Linett ○ Bank Miller ○ Eckhard Niebergall ○ Brian Sain
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SPECIAL
DOUBLE
ISSUE



WHEN YOU'RE IN SECOND PLACE,
ATTACK THE LEADER.
WHEN YOU'RE IN FIRST PLACE,
ATTACK YOURSELF.

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the PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

First, let me extend greetings and holiday cheer to all of the members of the International Association of Law Enforcement Firearms Instructors. I hope that each of you look forward to this special time of the year and take the opportunity to enjoy time with family and friends and enjoy the New Year. IALEFI® again moves towards a new year of training and training opportunities for each of you.

The former President of Harvard University, Derek Bok, once said, "If you think education is expensive, try ignorance." Ignorance is what a training organization is all about. Our goal is always to teach, to train and to enhance the awareness and abilities of our membership. We do this via this magazine, we do this via our Regional Training Conferences, and we do this via our Annual Training Conference.

This year the Annual Training Conference will be held in Reno, NV, beginning May 4th, 2008. This will be our third trip to Reno and again we look forward to the hospitality of the Washoe County Sheriffs' Office and the Silver Legacy Resort Hotel. Reno is a great city, or as the motto of Reno says, "The Biggest Little City in the World". The ranges are great, the weather is always excellent, and the hotel and facilities are tremendous. Where else can you eat at twenty-two different restaurants and never leave the building? Again, this year we will offer an extensive venue of classes to include a large number of armorers' courses, range activities, and classroom instruction. We also look forward to tremendous support from our Corporate Sponsors and a great opening day Exhibit Hall. Please start making plans now to join us in Reno. It is never too early to start preparations!

Thanks to IALEFI® member and President of "Polizeitrainer in Deutschland e.V.", Eckhard Niebergall, I will be making my first trip abroad this year and look forward to meeting many of our international members at the European Police Trainers Conference to be held March 13-14, 2008 in Nuremberg, Germany.

As an IALEFI® member, remember it is an obligation to vote for members of the Board of Directors. The ballots will be sent out after the first of the year. Remember to vote – it is a right, a privilege, and an obligation. This Board of Directors directs the operation of YOUR organization, so please be a part of the process in helping select the best possible people to direct YOUR organization.

Recently I attended my high school reunion, the year of which I will not divulge. As a part of one of the presentations, a very good friend, Kelli Barham, quoted an old Chinese proverb, and I would like to share that with you at this time. "When planning for a year, plant corn. When planning for a decade, plant trees. When planning for a lifetime, train and educate people." That ancient proverb addresses what we do. We train and educate in order to preserve life, in order to extend the lifetime of our fine officers throughout the world by providing those tasks that will keep them safe today and tomorrow. You, our members, are world leaders in training and educating for a lifetime. What an awesome task, what a wonderful opportunity, and what gratification when that job has been done and done well. In order to do that job, you too must be trained and educated. Please take every opportunity available to you to train, to receive that education so that you might educate others. That is who we are, firearms trainers!

Please take the time to be more than just a reader of this magazine. Please host a Regional Training Conference, attend the Annual Training Conference, vote for members of the Board of Directors, recruit new members, and write articles for publication in your magazine.

Please stay safe and I look forward to seeing all of you whenever our paths may cross.

Steve Johnson

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2008 ANNUAL TRAINING CONFERENCE SCHOLARSHIP UPDATE

The IALEFI® Scholarship Committee is now accepting applications for the 2008 ATC.

This program is designed to assist smaller agencies in developing a firearms instructor program and assist individual officers in becoming instructors. We have found that many smaller agencies did not have a full time firearms instructor program and many trainers volunteered their time and talents to teach their officers. We have also found that many times officers paid out of their own pocket to attend any firearms related classes.

Applications will be accepted from any officer in the Law Enforcement or Correctional field. Primary consideration will be given to individual who meet one or more of the following.

1. Officers from agencies who do not have a full time firearms instructor program and have had an officer involved shooting resulting in death or injury.
2. Officers from agencies who have been personally involved in an officer related shooting.
3. Any agency who has suffered a death or serious injury as a result of firearm training related incident.
4. Any individual who desires to be firearms instructor and is paying for his /her education out of their pocket.

To apply for the scholarship, application must be made in writing on department letterhead paper and must be accompanied with a resume indicating the background and experience of the applicant. Along with this should be a narrative essay or statement of facts as to the above criteria. Applicants must be an IALEFI® member.

Any member can recommend an officer for the award. Corporate sponsors can also nominate persons that they feel would fulfill the criteria. Applications must be received at the IALEFI® Corporate offices no later that January 31st. The Applicant's credentials will be verified and the application will be voted on by the Board of Directors.

The award includes a one-time waiver of the ATC conference fee and \$500.00 for conference expenses.

Stay safe and keep your eye on the front sight.

O. Frank Repass
Chairman, Scholarship Committee
Kennedy Space Center, Florida



Are Instructors Providing Adequate Firearms Training?

BY SGT. TIM BANE

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Firearms instructors today are tasked with an enormous responsibility to train the officers within their respective departments to handle firearms in accordance with Federal, State, and local policies. That statement we are all aware of and try to do our best to comply but what if we as instructors are just going through the motions or are the officers just showing up and doing the bare minimum?

As firearms instructors most of us have other jobs that we have to complete as well as the firearms training so how do we balance one against the other. Sometimes this balance is thrown off by administrations that are looking to cut cost and it seems that most deem that firearms training can be cut back due to the cost of munitions, supplies, and overtime. Recently the rising cost of training ammunition has had negative effects on the training and an easy out for

administrators saying that the current cost was not budgeted.

The worst case scenario in firearms training is that the instructors themselves have become complacent in their position and just go through the motions during the allotted training time. This is not saying that it is done on purpose but fighting the system and fighting the officers lack of willingness to utilize the training time to its fullest can cause some people to do just what is necessary to show training was completed. The minimum standard firearms instructor can be just as much of a problem with officers' knowledge as the officers themselves.

Officers who show up on range days and just want to get it over with will have such a low chance of learning a small change in policy, safety procedures or just what may keep them alive on the street. The minimum standard officers can mostly be identified by asking, "What is the least amount I need on the target?" or, "How



long do we have to be here today?" So does that mean the firearms instructor is providing them inadequate training or is the officer short changing themselves? Could be both, if officer is being trained by the minimum standard firearms instructor and they only want to get by.

Administrations can play a big part in the minimum standards being sought today by their lack of knowledge that they are condoning their officers to be barely trained for the least amount of money possible. Sure they know that there are basic standards and that if they fail to train to those standards then the liability falls squarely on their shoulders but it will also fall squarely on the instructor's shoulders.

There is a multitude of ways to combat the problems stated and they start with us, the firearms instructors. Firearms instructors everywhere need to embrace the idea that their training never stops, and we need to continue our training by reading, by attending local training (even if it's basic firearms shooting), and by trying to attend anything we can get our hands on. Those firearms instructors that are always looking for ways to improve themselves and the training they give their officers should reach out to other instructors that may not have the funds to attend long distance training and invite them to a range day. Information goes a long way to combat minimalism and providing that information by either written, oral or example can help.

Changing the ways of officers can be difficult due to the mind set and the possibility that they may not enjoy shooting. Changing up the type of training and making the range day fun can make people learn when they don't even know they may learn a new technique. Demonstrating the request should show those who doubt that what you are saying is worth their time to learn does two things: first, it will show them that it can be done, and second, it is actually easier than it sounds. Officers who have been shooting for a long time will always resist change because they have always done it this way or that so they are the ones who really need to try the change or addition. We need to do what we can and remove that minimalist attitude and get them to strive for the highest standard possible.

Administrations, well those are a lot more difficult to change so this is where we have to be armed with a vast knowledge of current court rulings be it Federal, State or local. If the budget is being cut and traditional firearms training is down to once or twice a year then alternatives need to be brought up like purchasing a simulator for long term training, FX training equipment or airsoft equipment. If we are to approach the use of an alternative training then again we will need to do our homework and have all the facts and figures readily available to present it.

We as firearms instructors need to be well rounded in training firearms today since there are other options to live fire and if our

budgets get cut then we need to revive and raise our standards by using these alternatives. I recently moved our qualification standards from 85% to 100% and it wasn't because I could but because I wanted to provide the officers I train to have more than adequate training and to raise their confidence if the need does arise to use their weapon on the street. During the normal firearms training I encourage my officers to shoot and constantly ask questions. I make myself available to them for any issue they have and will work with them. I am working on setting up video on the range to show officers what they are doing when they shoot thus trying to raise their standards. Budgetarily I will be able to provide my officers more realistic training with the alternatives and satisfy the Supreme Court rulings dealing with shoot no-shoot scenarios, force on force training and still maintain a quality training environment.

So back to the heading of this: "Are Instructors Providing Adequate Firearms Training?" Each of us needs to look at our programs and make sure that we as instructors are doing our best to provide our officers the best possible training in the amount of time available. Do our homework and positively approach the administration with the reasons for the amount of training we are requesting. And lastly encourage our officers to strive for the best they can do by providing updated and, for lack of better words, fun training. **TFI**



THE **FIREARMS** INSTRUCTOR

FOR IALEFI members BY IALEFI members.

Contributions are always welcome!

- ◆ **Write an article** ◆
- ◆ **Send photos** ◆
- ◆ **Respond to an article from a previous issue** ◆
- ◆ **Share your experiences with your fellow members** ◆

You never know - your photo may end up on our cover!



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A collection of police equipment including handcuffs, a baton, and a pepper spray canister. The pepper spray is labeled 'STREAM 5.5% PEPPERMACE MK-3 DA NET WEIGHT: 1.60 OZ. Net Weight: 1.12 oz. Mfg. No. of 1 Sec. Burns: 11'.

Integrating Weapon Systems during Range Exercises

by Lou Ann Hamblin

Would anyone ever really have a need to transition from one control device to the next?

What about deploying multiple levels of force during an encounter? What are appropriate weapon combinations?

Whose responsibility is it to address integrating weapon systems; firearms instructors or defensive tactics instructors?

History:

In 1997, we designed firearms training specific to the needs of the police cyclist. At that time it was apparent that padded cycling gloves had some initial affect an officer's ability to grip the pistol which sometimes affected shot placement. As weapon training became more advanced, it was determined that bike officers who wore gloves could face challenges not only while handling and firing their sidearm, but also when deploying their aerosol sprays, baton, hand cuffs, flashlights, etc. We began *integrating weapon systems* during live fire drills which forced bike officers to *work off the gun belt* and deploy less lethal weapon systems, bridging from one level of force to the next. We found great value in implementing these types of drills and soon exposed all of our uniform officers to this type of range training. In 2004 Team One Network presented this class at the IALEFI® Annual Training Conference as an instructor development class which raised a number of questions as well as the participant's level of understanding.

These drills can be challenging for some officers because not enough time is spent in most firearms programs familiarizing officers with the location of their gear on duty belts. First, locating the tool of choice can be challenging for some officers, particularly those who have made changes to accommodate new technology, i.e. Taser, weapon light, or non-essential devices such as pagers, cell phones and leathermen tools. Additionally equipment placement will vary depending on an officer's physical makeup, i.e. waist circumference, unless specified by policy.

Second, some officers find that deploying their control devices efficiently is compromised due to poor weapon placement and lack of adequate belt keepers, (which assist in creating space between control devices and holsters). During transition drills it is not uncommon for officers to unintentionally drop magazines, handcuffs and flashlights during range exercises. *A case of too many control devices and not enough hands.*

Would anyone ever really have a need to transition from one weapon system to the next?

"The Use of Force Continuum is a sliding scale, not a fixed one and an officer might have to escalate to the threat given including the use of deadly force, back down to verbal, then back up the scale to Taser or O.C. all in the span of a few seconds. Not being able to do so could cause the agency AND the officer trouble later in civil court proceedings or I.A. complaints." (Capt. Mike Williams, Chattanooga PD, TN)

As most instructors are aware the standard *immediate action* solution to a long gun failure is of course transitioning to the sidearm. Even street officers who have experienced minimum patrol rifle training understand the value of this transition.

Performing “immediate action drills” is a simple form of contingency planning; in other words, ‘a pre-programmed physical response to a systems failure.’ Contingency planning or transitioning drills assist the officer in the ‘*what to do when*’ decision making process. Oftentimes officers plan on



A case of too many control devices and not enough hands.

equipment working as effectively as it did in the gym or at the range and are sometimes shocked when things do not go according to plan. Sometimes taking a step down on the use of force continuum is a viable option in the field and in reality based training, however, it is sometimes ignored due to *compartmentalization training*, i.e. training based solely upon one control device handcuff training, baton, chemical aerosol, pistol, Taser, etc. Compartmentalized training causes officers to learn several systems individually. However, the entire gunbelt as a package is oftentimes ignored. The introduction of stress during scenarios causes the compartmentalized officer to ineffectively transition through the use of force continuum and utilize *all* of the tools available to him.

During instructor development classes I show an in-car video capturing a former New Mexico police officer who affects a traffic stop which eventually results in an altercation with one of the men producing a shovel from the back of the pick up truck. The officer engages both males and progressively uses empty hand controls, handcuffs, his baton, and eventually draws his pistol while providing verbal direction. The officer retains all of his control devices until

backup arrives. After viewing the video, I ask instructors, ‘given this set of circumstances, what would you like to see your officers do in order to ultimately take control of the situation?’ Generally a healthy, thought provoking discussion fills the room. Some instructors appreciate the escalation in force as the threat continues to escalate where others are rightfully concerned about the officer shooting the tip his baton off when it crosses the path of his muzzle. Some have discomfort about him holding the handcuffs and baton while attempting to maintain a decent grip on his pistol. Oftentimes there is the issue of dropping the baton if a less-than-safe area exists, and so on. Never the less, we should discuss these types of issues and

quite possibly be proactive in creating solutions for our officers.

Tactical Considerations of Discarding or Maintaining Weapons during the Transition Process:

The “considerations for transitioning” are the conditions and environment present at the time. They will determine if the officer is required and able to transition from one control device to the other, and how.

How much time does the officer have to process incoming data?

Are there multiple officers at the scene?

Are there multiple suspects/subjects at the scene?

Is the officer stationary or on the move to another location?

Is the situation indoors or outdoors?

What are the distances involved?

Are there physical obstacles or barriers in the way? CQB?

What are the cover options? Cover location?

What are appropriate weapon combinations?

Integrating weapons during basic line drills can provide instructors with an opportunity to provide desirable combinations and options. If it is not clearly spelled out in policy and followed up on in training then

you can expect to see just about anything in scenarios and on the street. One outcome of integrating weapon systems during range exercises is that training officers can immediately address undesirable combinations such as: Tasers in one hand and pistols in the other, chemical aerosols and pistols, handcuffs and pistol. Most will agree that a chemical aerosol and expandable baton would be appropriate given certain circumstances but training officers and administration must first decide what is appropriate and what is not, and then train officers to that standard. Some officers may not be capable of deploying multiple control devices simultaneously due to physical limitations. What would you *like* to see your officers do with non-effective or tools that simply fail? Do you have any expectations of your officers in these types of situations?

Types of Transitions:

For the sake of explanation, labels have been provided for two different types of transitions. The command to “engage” is given when the instructor wants the officers to engage any trigger or deliver a baton strike to the target area (simulating a strike, of course).

1) “*Tactical Transitions:*” Similar to that of a tactical reload, the officer saves the previously used weapon. It is presumed that the officer has time to holster or re-secure the tool at hand. The officer may retain the control device in hand or re-secure in the holster or pouch.

2) “*Speed Transitions:*” Dropping the previously used weapon or control device and escalating quickly is the best option. Similar to that of a speed reload, the officer has no time to holster or re-secure, or both hands are required to physically deal with the problem. For example, a chemical aerosol spray has been deployed and is either ineffective or the threat escalates to deadly force causing the officer to quickly escalate as well.

Range Exercises:

The first skill-building exercise comes in the form of locating the control device on the gun belt and deploying the control device in an efficient manner, AKA psychomotor skill development. Blue Tasers, inert O.C., etc. are mandatory for these types of exercises. The instructor gives the command to draw the particular control device i.e. “Pistol, O.C. or baton.” The officer locates and deploys the weapon. Then the command to recover to the holster is given. You may, or may not be surprised when you

observe officers “hunt and peck” trying to locate their weapons and then deploy them in a less-than smooth manner even though this is considered a warm up exercise.

Compartmentalized training causes officers to learn several systems individually. However, the entire gunbelt as a package is oftentimes ignored.

Transition Drill Examples:

After you provide the officers with the initial exercise start with tactical transitions giving the officer to secure the first weapon selected before moving to the next weapon. For example: The officer’s initial command is to draw the pistol, then move to the Taser. After the officers have development smooth transitions have them begin to transition

more quickly and incorporate urgency in the transition. For example: The officer’s initial command is O.C., the second command is pistol with immediate follow up commands to engage the target. The combinations of drills are endless. Verbal direction is also utilized, particularly after the target is engaged irrespective of the control device utilized. Establishing the habit of verbally directing adversaries after engaging them is oftentimes ignored at the range and in the gym.

The Power of Role Playing:

This is *the what* to transition to, and *the when* to transition decision making element of weapon integration. *The when* and *the why* of transitioning weapon systems introduced in role playing exercises and are later emphasized during teaching or testing scenarios.

Role playing reinforces line drills and bridges the gap between range exercises and high fidelity scenarios. Role playing with Airsoft weapons, inert O.C., training batons and Tasers provides “situations” during range exercises. Providing real time feedback in a coach and pupil setting is very effective and brings relativity and context to the previously learned drills and concepts.

Whose responsibility is it to address integrating weapon systems; firearms instructors or defensive tactics instructors?

The answer is both. If you are among those bearing the title of Use of Force Instructor then you may already be delivering some form of weapon integration in your weapons training. If you are not, consider decompartmentalizing your training in terms of weapon deployment. Add in a role play or low fidelity scenario to test appropriate weapon selection with given conditions. As a result you may find an increase in your officer’s performance during scenario based training and in the field when it comes to locating, deploying and transitioning weapons appropriately. At the very least, the officers will become reacquainted with their gunbelt and all of their control devices. **TFI**

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Officer Hamblin is a firearms instructor, Team One Network Instructor and currently sits on IALEFI’s Board of Directors. Lou Ann holds a master’s degree in Human Performance Technology and Instructional Design from the University of Michigan.



THE FIREARMS INSTRUCTOR

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NOTE FROM THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

We encourage you to submit articles and photos for publication, as well as letters and comments on articles which have appeared in previous issues. We can also use short “Training Tips” and “Safety Tips”, cover photos, and news items of interest from a training perspective. Please refer to the Editorial Guidelines below for details on format for your submission. Take advantage of this opportunity to share information with other instructors, and see your work in print!

Editorial Guidelines

IALEFI® actively solicits the submission of articles to be considered for publication in *THE FIREARMS INSTRUCTOR*, and encourages members to share their ideas, experience, and expertise with others. Neither IALEFI®, nor *THE FIREARMS INSTRUCTOR*, endorses any specific techniques, training programs, trainers, products, or manufacturers. Members are urged to provide us with input on the style and content of *THE FIREARMS INSTRUCTOR*. Submitted articles should conform to these rules:

1. Articles should be typewritten on 8½" x 11" white paper. Please have your article free of spelling and grammatical errors. We encourage you in addition to the hard copy of your material, to submit your article on a

standard 3½" IBM formatted computer disk or CD Rom;

2. A black and white photograph of the author, along with a brief biographical sketch, should be included;

3. Any photographs submitted should include captions. Black and white photos are preferred. Photos will be returned on request. For optimal print quality, photos should be a minimum of 275 dots per inch.

4. Submitted manuscripts will not be returned. The author should retain a copy of the manuscript.

Articles should be directed towards law enforcement firearms training, trainers, instructional methods, and officer survival. The specific techniques and practices proposed in the article may be original, unconventional, or controversial, but should reflect sound training and safety principles. IALEFI® does not publish product reviews, evaluations, or endorsements. Articles on other subjects may mention and discuss the use of specific products, including limited professional critique of the products, but the thrust of the article must be one of training methods, firearms techniques, and officer survival.

IALEFI® reserves the right to edit submitted material for spelling, grammar, syntax, clarity, or length. IALEFI® reserves the right to reject articles from members or others. IALEFI® reserves the right to reject any submitted material, including articles, photographs, letters, or advertisements, that, in the sole discretion of the Editorial Committee would reflect or impact negatively on IALEFI® or its stated goals. Members wishing to inquire as to suitability of a particular subject, before writing an article, should call the IALEFI® office.

Articles or photos which have been published by, or are also under consideration by, other commercial publications are not acceptable, unless prior notice is given to IALEFI®. If your manuscript is accepted for publication, IALEFI® will notify you within ten weeks from the date of receipt. Upon notice of acceptance, the author grants IALEFI® and *THE FIREARMS INSTRUCTOR* exclusive one time world first publication and serial rights for a period of twelve months.

FUNCTIONAL CONDITIONING

PART 2

by John E. Combs
NC Justice Academy

In the previous article published in Issue 41, we looked at reasons for using functional training techniques, along with cognitive factors, designing a functional training program, and issues and concerns in determining “functionality.” As previously stated, in this article we will look at components of Speed, Agility, Power, Power Development, Movement Mechanics, and the techniques, drills, and some examples of exercises that can be used to develop each of these components.

Components of Physical Preparation¹

Speed is the result of applying explosive force to a specific movement technique - the ability to achieve high velocity. Interval workouts are a good way to increase speed. These workouts are tough, so make sure students warm up with 5-10 minutes of easy cardiovascular work, such as a light jog or jogging in place. The main idea behind an interval training routine is to exercise at an intensity that you could not maintain for more than 3 minutes. You would then continue your routine at a lower or moderate intensity to recover, and then go back to the high-intensity interval. There are numerous ways to achieve this, but one example may be to warm up, sprint hard for 2 minutes, walk for 1 minute, repeat...cool down with a light jog. Another idea is to sprint for 20-30 seconds, jog lightly for 40 seconds to 1 minute and repeat. “Good-guy/bad-guy” runs can also be used.

Agility is the ability to explosively brake, change direction, and the ability to reactively combine with acceleration. *Why is agility training necessary?* Because you’re quickly changing directions, and the sudden change in force speeds up your reaction time and builds stability. Most agility drills work your body in multiple planes, increasing your calorie burn. A study published in *Medicine & Science in Sports & Exercise* found that backward movement burns significantly more calories than forward movement, and lateral motion burns twice as many as forward does. You are expending more energy because you’re using muscles that are under-trained. One example of a simple agility drill is a cone slalom. You could place 6-8 cones in a straight line about 1 yard apart - as fast as possible, run from one end to the other weaving back and forth between the cones, repeat. This could also be a timed drill to measure progress. Another example is a back pedal drill. You would sprint backward, keeping your eyes forward and maintaining a slight bend in the knees and hips. Use small, quick steps. *Alternate* backpedaling with forward sprints - sprint 5 to 15 yards and backpedal to the starting point.

Power^{2 3} - not brute strength - wins on the battlefield or in the competitive arena. Motor skills must be performed quickly and decisively. Therefore, the best way to develop increased power for motor skills is to train as you perform, *explosively*.

Power is defined as “the time rate of doing work” where work is the product of the force exerted on an object and the distance the object moves in the direction in which the force is exerted. In other words, “*how fast can you be strong?*” Power comes primarily from two sources, *mass* (size, usually the result of great strength) and *speed*. It can be thought of as *moving strength* or *speed-strength*. The primary means to improve power is to employ (after proper preparation) explosive training. What does this mean? Basically, any exercise can be performed quickly (with power), but large muscle, multiple joint movements are best and can be safely performed explosively. Although the proportion and distribution of fast-twitch muscle fibers dictates to a great extent how explosively we perform (and is thought to be largely genetic), we can train those fast-twitch fibers. *Will explosive weight lifting automatically increase speed, power, and quickness? No. Lifting explosively is only a ‘demonstration’ of power - not an ‘adaptation.’ Explosive lifting and explosive performance are two different things.*

The brief execution times of most enforcement motor skill techniques require rapid force generation, meaning officers must be trained how to generate greater force and/or to improve their rate of force production. Most “functional” movements have a *ballistic* nature even when initiated from a *static* position. Beginning with a counter move-

ment, muscles are rapidly lengthened and shortened in a reactive or spring-like manner, known as the *stretch-shortening cycle*. For example, think of a person throwing or hitting a ball, a golf swing, or throwing an effective punch or kick. To do this effectively and with power, there has to be (albeit brief) some kind of wind-up or “lock-and-load.”⁴

*Plyometrics*⁵ apply to any exercise or jumping drill that uses the stretch reflex of a muscle. This takes place when a muscle is pre-stretched (“countermovement”) prior to a muscular contraction resulting in a more powerful movement. Plyometrics for the lower body may include bounding, hopping, and various box drills such as depth jumping; plyometrics for the upper body may include ballistic (or “drop”) push-ups and

may incorporate medicine balls to induce the stretch reflex. A recent study published in the *Journal of Athletic Training* verified that when done twice weekly, plyometrics improve vertical jump by nearly 6 percent. Plyometrics excite the fast-twitch muscle fibers, which are the ones required for maximizing strength gains. Try incorporating plyometric drills into your warm-up routine to maximize performance and strength gains. Make movements quick and explosive to turn on the nerves going to the muscles. Ideally, you want to use these movements to enable a muscle or group of muscles to reach maximal force in the shortest possible time. Although there is book upon book readily available outlining hundreds of plyometric drills, it is important in law enforcement

to first determine what we are training and then selecting the proper exercise/drill (as would any sport coach). Some general recommendations for plyometric drills are as follows:

Frequency of the exercises typically ranges from 1 to 3 per week, though research is limited on optimal frequency. *Recovery time* between sessions is suggested to be 48 to 72 hours. Recovery time between sets is determined by a proper work-to-rest ratio (i.e., 1:5 to 1:10), usually between 2 to 3 minutes. *Volume* is typically expressed as the number of foot contacts per workout. Appropriate volumes may be as follows: *Beginner* (80 to 100), *Intermediate* (100 to 120), and *Advanced* (120 to 140). Keep in mind however, that plyometric drills are

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very high impact and explosive in nature and therefore have a greater potential to cause injury than more conventional exercises. It would be unwise for a person who is obese, physically untrained, or has problems with bone, muscle, and/or joint injuries to use plyometrics.

Improving Physical Skills⁶

To become ingrained into “muscle or motor memory”, a specific skill must be *practiced perfectly* for thousands of repetitions, as it would be used in reality.

Strengthen the major muscle groups to be used during performance. The idea here is to NOT try to mimic a skill in the weight room, but rather concentrate on simple strength training. In other words, a stronger muscle can produce more force; with this ability, less effort will be required to perform a skill more quickly, accurately, and efficiently.

Increase aerobic capacity related to skills involving aerobic exertion. The best way to do this is to practice the specific skill in an identical manner during training. Training has to be as *identical* as possible for maximum benefits related to skill performance.

The core muscles have one purpose; to provide functional support for the body while the body is in motion. The following are some basic benefits of functional training:⁷

1. Improves movement, skill, and athleticism
2. Increases balance and body awareness
3. Can be modified to law enforcement specific training
4. Increases muscular size and strength

5. Requires little or no expensive equipment

6. Helps to expose structural, unilateral, and biomechanical weakness

7. Can be performed virtually anywhere

In both parts I & II of this article, we have covered numerous topics in the area of functional conditioning. All of these topics are intended to present both students and physical skills instructors with knowledge, methods, and strategies that will better prepare them to begin a functional conditioning training regiment, with the goal of increasing their odds of survival in physical confrontations.

The lesson here is that functional training is not “the only show in town” and that, although vital in all aspects of motor skill development, it is but one aspect of the overall process. Its value lies in knowing why, when, how, and how much it should be used in the training process and not in its sole use to the exclusion of all other methods.⁸ **TFI**

“Performance is the difference between fitness and fatigue.”

- - Dr. Hugh Morton, Sports Scientist

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John Combs is an Instructor/Coordinator at the NC Justice Academy and the School Director for the Physical Fitness and Subject Control/Arrest Techniques Training Programs, along with serving as an adjunct faculty member at Campbell University and Methodist College. Combs has been retained numerous times as an expert wit-

ness in the areas of use of force and police training, and has given reports, depositions, and trial testimony in these areas. Combs has over 19 years of law enforcement experience, an MPA from UNC-Charlotte, and is a Certified Strength and Conditioning Specialist through the National Strength & Conditioning Association and a Certified Health/Fitness Instructor through the American College of Sports Medicine. He can be contacted at 910-525-4151, ext. 264 or e-mail: jcombs@ncdoj.gov.

ENDNOTES

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Training

based on

Motivation, Knowledge, Skills and Attitudes

by Carl D. Steinhart M.Ed., CLET

Performance problems cannot always be addressed by instruction. If the performance problem is a lack of knowledge, skills or the wrong attitudes, then it can and should be addressed by instruction. As instructors we have all experienced the officers with the “I know it all” or “This is a waste of my time” or “This is the same stuff over and over again” attitude. These statements come from officers with varying years of street experience and many of them truly believe they have learned everything.

When I think about the officers I have instructed in firearms and tactical training over the last twenty years, I remember many officers that expressed some of the above listed attitudes.

In *The Role of Instructional Design in Solving Performance Problems*, Rothwell and Kazanas list seven factors that are critical for individual performance (page 7):

Factor	Definition on performance	Questions to consider about the influence of the factor
Job Context	This is the environment of the job, including supervisor(s), equipment and tools to be used, customers and coworkers	Are the proper tools or equipment available?
Motivation	The desire to perform	Do people want to perform?
Knowledge	Facts and information essential to performing a task	Do people have the necessary facts and information to make decisions?
Skills	Abilities to do something for successful job performance	Can people do things associated with successful job performance?
Attitudes	Feelings about performance that are voiced to others	How do people feel about their behavior?
Abilities	Present capabilities to behave in certain ways	Do people possess the necessary talents and mental or physical characteristics?
Aptitude	The future capability to behave in certain ways	Are people physically and/or mentally capable of learning how to perform?

In this article, I will focus on motivation, knowledge, skills, and attitudes. I will address these factors as they relate to the officers that are “un-trainable.” I will also address what instructors must understand in order to get through to these officers.

MOTIVATION

Learning takes place in people who are motivated. According to Robert M. Gagne and Marcy Perkins Driscoll, in *Essentials of Learning for Instruction*, “the most fundamental motivation for a learner is the desire to enter into a learning situation.” Do most police agencies ask or demand officers attend firearms training? If the answer is “Yes”, we demand, mandate, or in any way require them to attend firearms training, we have already changed the learners desire and probably their motivation. I understand the law in most states requires officers to qualify to a minimum standard. There are plenty of valid legal reasons why police agencies require firearms qualification; however these mandates adversely influence motivation.

Motivation is described as the desire to perform. Desire to learn becomes a primary factor influencing training for many officers. The desire to perform has many various and difficult meanings and questions. Who wants the learner to perform? What do we want the learner to perform? How much or how well should the learner perform? Does it matter to the performer if they perform well? Is there a standard of performance that is acceptable to the performer that is different from the instructor’s standard? If an officer has no desire to perform beyond minimal required standards, can we ever hope to improve motivation? If your department only requires mandatory firearms qualifications, you lose the ability to motivate officers. Many officers will have no desire to perform to high standards because they are only required to achieve a passing score. The lack of motivation in “mandatory training” is perhaps the largest single factor for flawed training.

A critical element in motivation is the condition of attention. “For the establishment of motivation, however, the initial attention getting stimulus is not enough. Attention must be maintained throughout the course of a learning act, and this requires frequent and varied presentation techniques (Gagne and Driscoll, 1988, p.69). The problem with this idea is that most police agencies do not train enough, and do not use different methods; therefore they are losing the motivation needed to change behavior. How do we gain an officers attention if all we do is say “Is the line ready, the line is ready, fire?” How do we gain attention if we only require officers to qualify? Remember qualification is not training and it certainly loses the abil-

ity to keep attention probably after the first time an officer realizes they can qualify. In order to maintain attention, instructors must develop new and different types of firearms training. This must go beyond qualification. Develop tactical courses, shoot don’t shoot scenarios, decision making scenarios, timed speed events and events that relate to the officers need to win a gunfight.

A second condition for learner motivation is the requirement of relevance. “Relevance is achieved by appeal to a somewhat different kind of learner interest—the kind that convinces learners that what is to be learned will have personal significance and value for them” (Gagne and Driscoll, 1988, p. 69). What relevance exists in shooting at a B-27 or TQ-19 target? They are stationary and paper! Big deal. How does this relate to offi-

If your department only requires mandatory firearms qualifications, you lose the ability to motivate officers. Many officers will have no desire to perform to high standards because they are only required to achieve a passing score.

cer survival? Unless “bad guys” are wearing a B-27 or TQ-19 shirt and standing still, it is all a meaningless waste of time and money. Relevance means we need to give officers on the street realism. Develop a shoot don’t shoot course. Develop your own shoot house with various threats. Use Air Soft firearms or Simunitions to create relevant stress scenarios. Conduct high risk traffic stop training or room entry training while using Simunitions or Air Soft guns. Make training relevant to everyday conditions of an officer’s job.

Finally motivation requires satisfaction. Satisfaction is the successful completion of a task. The problem with standard police firearms qualifications is that it is not training and the need for satisfaction is basically non existent. One of the statements I remember about satisfaction and motivation is “Big deal, I qualified, I always do.” Does it sound like that officer was satisfied or

motivated? Satisfaction is having an officer make it through a difficult tactical course of fire without shooting any “good guy” targets. Satisfaction is having your officers perform tactical and emergency reloads without telling them to do it. Satisfaction is watching officers move to cover and think about their next step. It sounds like I am talking about satisfying the instructor, instead of the student, but it works both ways. The bottom line is, if your courses are challenging and realistic, your students will see what they are doing wrong and they will want to perform not for you but for them. Once they understand this tactical training may save their lives, even the most stubborn officers come around and try to perform to the best of their ability.

KNOWLEDGE

Does the learner have the facts and information essential to perform the required task and the ability to make appropriate decisions? Knowledge is simply “what the employee knows. It is important in terms of jobs and training because people usually perform better if they understand what they are doing and why” (McArdle, 1989, p.34). Instructors should figure out what the learner knows. Instructors often assume officers know what they want them to do. Remember, if it is not important to them, they probably will not “know” it. “In order to plan events in the learner’s environment which will activate and support learning, a teacher must gain a concept of what is going on “inside the learners head.” Robert M. Gagne – *Essentials of learning for instruction*.

Knowledge is something that instructors may take for granted. Knowledge or learning should occur in a learner’s head. How do instructors know when, or if, learning has occurred? By performance? “It might seem that a most economical way to obtain knowledge about learning would be to ask people how they learn. In general, however, learners are simply not aware of the internal processes that occur when they are learning and so cannot report them.” Robert M. Gagne – *Essentials of learning for instruction*.

Very often learners really don’t want to know about firearms training and the reality is all they know is they must carry a firearm to be a police officer. They know they must qualify in order to remain gainfully employed. This knowledge or lack thereof is critical for an instructor to recog-

nize. Certainly we expect our police officers to have the basic skills and intelligence to gather facts and understand why they must qualify with a firearm. This is where the problems begin. Not every officer cares about firearms training like we do.

As instructors we need to know what our learners know. We need to talk to officers and determine if they have ideas for tactical training. We need to empower these officers, making them feel connected to the training. We may need to show the officer how to complete the tactical course, how to perform tactical and emergency reloads, how to identify and move to cover, how to recognize a threat, etc. After we show the officer what we expect, have the officer complete the task. To figure out if learning occurred bring the officer back in a day or two and have them perform a similar tactical course. If they “know” what they did, they should be able to do it again.

SKILLS

Skills are defined as the ability to do something for successful job performance. The obvious question is, can people do things associated with successful job performance? Skills involve the ability to do something –such as properly operating a handgun, shotgun or patrol rifle. “Skills imply actions; others can observe them” (McArdle, 1989, p. 34). Skills or motor skills must be considered as an essential element to an instructors understanding of the range of human performances. Motor skills are certainly required in learning how to properly hold, manipulate, control and fire any weapon system. If learners do not have the skills or ability for successful job performance, how much time do instructors give in order to accomplish the stated goals? Is it true that some people simply do not have the ability to properly squeeze a trigger, or hold a handgun, or shoot weak handed? The answer to that question is an absolute YES. This happens for any number of reasons, poor hiring practices, inadequate academy training, injury and or illness. If it is true, what must instructors do to develop the skills necessary?

Instructors are responsible for training all officers. If departments have officers with poor motor skills, instructors need to find a way to improve the learner’s skills. Remember, it is our responsibility as instructors to identify poor shooting skills and correct them. If an officer has an injury or other medical condition that prevents “proper” grip or trigger control, we must figure out a

way to help the shooter.

At a recent training event I witnessed an officer that lost his trigger finger trying to qualify. I watched the officer pull the trigger with his middle finger and shots going all over the target. Every time the officer pulled the trigger he had to readjust his grip. It took the better part of the day to figure out what he needed to maintain the skills he once had with all his digits. We figured it out and he qualified. This was a big deal for him, because up to that point he could not qualify let alone do anything tactically. He was full of motivation because he wanted to keep his job. He had the knowledge to complete the task because he was on the job for twenty years. He lost the skills he once had because of the injury sustained to his hand. I believe many Chiefs or instructors would have written this officer off and put him out on a disability. It was not easy but if you take the time and care about your officers you should be able to adjust for skill deficiencies.

ATTITUDES

Attitudes are feelings about performance that are voiced to others. How do learners feel about their behavior or performance? Instructors should “accept that how people feel about what they are doing and the organization for which they are working has some effect on their performance” (McArdle, 1989, p.34). We experience training problems when we hear the types of feelings listed in paragraph number one, such as, “This again,” or “This is a waste of my time.” These statements may demonstrate a bad attitude, but do we only need to worry about these statements if the officer is poor shooter? What do we do with the officer that makes these remarks and shoots 90% or better on qualifications and performs well in any tactical situation?

Instructors must pay attention to what the learners are saying to others while at the range or the training site. Often instructors hear things like, “I do it this way because that is how I was instructed in the military” or “that is how my other department’s firearms instructor taught us.” Instructors need to listen to, address, and respond to these attitudes. Try to understand why the learner feels the way they were instructed in the past is the only legitimate way to accomplish the goal. As instructors it is our responsibility to listen to the attitudes and attempt to change the learner’s attitude or perhaps our own attitude. Both instructors and learners need to understand there are many proper ways to do things.

One way an instructor can change attitudes is with feedback. Feedback is the continuous process of providing information about an activity, sometimes during the activity itself (Nadler, 1977). By stimulating learners to change how or what they do, influences the quality of performance (Tosti, 1986). They also need to understand that some techniques have been deemed unsafe or are no longer applicable to modern law enforcement. There are a multitude of reasons why techniques change, most of the reasons involve officer safety, and instructors need to stay on top those ideas. We can change attitudes when we determine how to change or modify behavior. If a change or modification in behavior occurs and persists over a period of time, we can assume the learner actually learned.

CONCLUSION

If instructors remember motivation, knowledge, skills, and attitudes are essential for learning performance, learners will achieve success. There are many issues involved in quality successful training programs and these four ideas will cover most of them. Be creative and inventive, while focusing on realism and relevance. Officers that typically did not want to be involved will express interest and probably will perform better than ever before. **TFI**

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Carl D. Steinhart has been a police officer since 1983, and has a Master’s degree in Education – Training and Development from the Pennsylvania State University. He is also a Certified Law Enforcement Trainer from ASLET, specializing in firearms and tactical training. Steinhart is a life member of the National Rifle Association, a member of ASLET, of the National Tactical Officers Association, and The International Association of Law Enforcement Firearms Instructors. Steinhart is a certified instructor in pistol, tactical handgun, shotgun, patrol rifle, rapid deployment and others areas. Steinhart is also an adjunct professor at Harrisburg Area Community College (HACC), Harrisburg, and Elizabethtown College, Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania.

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

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
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The New or Problem Shooter: Finding a Way to Relate

by Brian K. Sain

I grew up shooting and hunting as a child and as a young man, was fortunate to be able to travel and compete with some of the best handgun metallic silhouette shooters in the world. Shooting open sighted handguns accurately to 200 meters requires countless hours of practice and mastery of proper hold, sight alignment/sight picture and trigger control. I was taught early on by the “old salts” of the game that shooting is 90% mental, 5% firearm and 5% ammunition. While these percentages may be arguable, I have found that the gist of the axiom has held true over the years. My coaches were all international class shooters and genuinely proud when “the kid” beat them fair and square; as they knew very well that they were the ones who had helped me attain that same level of competency. I often call upon that memory when teaching new students today, as I was once in their position.

Unfortunately, the new police recruit of today may not have had the same degree of shooting development that others may have had and the recruit’s first experience with firearms may very well be at the police academy. The new recruit may also find himself/herself under extreme pressures to perform and learning to deal with all of the pressures associated with being new to law enforcement in general; is a skill unto itself. One extreme pressure felt by a recruit who is having difficulty, is termination of employment after the student has already worked very hard to reach the current point in their training. No one wants to fail; especially if they have a family to feed. This can pose a problem for the firearms instructor, as sometimes the student just cannot seem to “get it.” The pressure gets so heavy at times that rather than better, the student’s performance actually gets worse – no matter how much practice and instruction the student receives. The challenge for the firearms instructor is to alleviate the pressure, instill confidence and find a way to convey what is being instructed; in a manner the individual shooter can grasp and successfully apply on the range. One method I have had success with is to ask the recruit (or problem shooter) what he or she likes to do when they are *not* doing police work and then develop a lesson tailored to their response. Most people are good at the things they *like*

to do and I have had success using this technique with many problem shooters. I will relate some of them here.

Problem shooter #1 - This student was a problem shooter in the academy and this continued as he entered his probationary period at the department. His supervisors assigned me to give him remedial instruction in lieu of his termination. He had failed numerous times previously, was discouraged at the prospect of failing again and was obviously psyching himself out. This was to be his last chance. I asked him what he liked to do outside of police work. The young man was formerly a semi-professional basketball player. I asked him if shooting a basketball was difficult for him to which he replied confidently, “No sir, it’s very easy.” Capitalizing on his confidence spike, I advised him that shooting a firearm could be easy for him too if he only looked at it differently. I asked him to tell me the exact, individual sequence of events required to properly shoot a net ripping free throw. He did so. I then stated, “So to make that free throw, one has to do a lot of small things correctly to get the required result, right?” He stated that this was correct. I then related every single aspect of discharging a firearm and making an X ring hit to the basketball shot he had just described. I simply told him that for every round he fired, to think of it as shooting a free throw, only different. He then proceeded to fire three successful qualification courses back to back shooting 90% or better each time.



Problem shooter #2 - This student had developed a bad habit of slapping the trigger. He was a former semi-pro football cornerback and sprinter. He is also a college graduate, so I asked him to tell me the quickest distance between two points. He correctly replied “a straight line.” I then asked if when he ran a sprint, if he focused on a point ahead and then ran to

that point to which he replied, "Yes, that is exactly how I run." I then asked him to get down as if in the blocks to begin a sprint. I asked him to imagine a starting gun firing and to come away from the blocks slowly as if to start a sprint. As he did so, I gave him a gentle but firm shoulder block which set him off of his original path. I then asked him to imagine himself as a bullet in the chamber of a firearm, waiting to be fired at a specific target. I advised him that just as he had been set off of his original path by my shoulder block, so would be a bullet if someone "shoulder blocked" the trigger every time they fired it and that this was essentially the same thing he was doing by slapping the trigger. I drew a small spot on the center of his target and asked him to fire every bullet as if it were he himself, running a sprint to that very spot, without "shoulder blocking" the trigger every time he fired it. His scores immediately improved dramatically.

Problem shooter #3 - This student would consistently look over his sights at the target just as he broke every shot. His targets were riddled with bullet holes from edge to edge. He liked to race motocross in his off time. I asked him if he ever won the races he entered. He confidently replied, "Sometimes, yes." Again, capitalizing on his confidence in what *he knew he could do well*, I asked that if when in a race that he was *winning*, if he always took a specific line or groove in the track when approaching a jump; one that had proven to be the fastest for him and that had kept him in the lead. He stated that this was indeed the case. So, I took a marker and made a one-inch mark on the center of his target. I then told him that upon each shot he fired, I wanted him to imagine that the front sight on his handgun was the front tire on his motocross bike and that the line on the target was the line in the track approaching a jump. He was to hit that same "line on the track" with his "front tire" every time he fired a shot. This forced him to concentrate on his sights and a specific spot on the target (sight picture/sight alignment) and his scores went from dismal to acceptable.

Problem shooter #4 - This student presented numerous problems. She understood the concepts of shooting that were relayed to her and could recite what she was *supposed* to do verbatim. But she was very nervous at the prospect of failure and simply could not put consistent hits on target. Like the example above, her targets were riddled with bullet holes

from edge to edge. When I asked what she liked to do in her off time, she told me that she liked to make candles. I was at a total loss for words and must have looked pretty funny with my lips tensed and my eyebrows subconsciously raised above

my glasses because the entire line burst with laughter. Knowing absolutely *nothing* about making candles proved to be a problem for *me!* So I asked that she explain the process to me. The candles she made were the type where molten wax is poured into a glass jar. I thought for a second and said, "if the wax missed the jar and ran all over the edges and table that it would be kind of an ugly mess, correct?" She agreed. I advised her that her recent targets looked sort of like a mass of wax that had missed the jar and that she would have to pour more accurately from now on. I advised her not to feel too badly because this

would certainly be the case if *I ever tried my hand at candle making*. This alleviated the pressure, made her laugh and got her mind completely off of failing. I asked if she actually sold a lot of the candles that she made and she stated that she sold every single one she made. Again, her confidence went up visibly because we were speaking of something *she knew she could do well*. So I drew a fist sized circle in the center of her target. I asked that she envision the circle as the bottom of a jar and that she envision every bullet she fired as the molten wax she was pouring into the jar. I told her I wanted her to do whatever she had to do to hit the center of the jar and pour me up a "nice looking candle" every time she pulled the trigger. Much to even *my* surprise, it worked.

But sometimes, despite the best efforts of the best instructors, students fail and the recruit must be let go in the best interests of all concerned. It is a simple fact that not everyone is cut out to be a police officer. Your students must walk before they can run and it is your job to help them reach the level they must attain if it is within their ability to do so. For me, it helps if I can find a way to relate to them individually. I will certainly have to do so if I ever find myself beside them during a gunfight; and one never knows when one of these same young officers may actually save the life of the same "old salt" that taught them how to shoot. **TFI**

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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The pressure gets so heavy at times that rather than better, the student's performance actually gets worse – no matter how much practice and instruction the student receives.



**Lessons Learned
from being taken**

HOSTAGE

By Tom Hausner

CRIME SCENE

You're on patrol and in your own world as most cops are working the late shift. You started your shift a couple of hours earlier and it's a Wednesday night on the midnight shift, so you think it will be a slow night like most midweek nights. Then your radio cracks with the sound of an officer screaming for assistance. You know that the officer is in real trouble as the tone in their voice is nothing you have ever heard before.

It will get worse before it gets better, the calm night you thought you were going to have is gone and an officer's worst nightmare is beginning.

On Wednesday, June 21, 2006 at approximately 11:46 PM, a deputy sheriff was dispatched to a domestic dispute between a husband and wife. The caller advised dispatch, "There's a guy outside beating up his wife or girlfriend." The caller did not know either person involved in the domestic. The caller was kept on the phone and advised that things had calmed down and that some others were outside and separated the two.

The call was in a rural area of the county, and as is commonplace in American Law Enforcement back up was not close, but was responding. Depending on how long you have been on the job, you have been in this position yourself. You get to the call, backup is not close, so you advise dispatch you have arrived and will be out of your squad.

When the deputy arrived nothing appeared out of the ordinary nor did the deputy see or hear anything that would set off the "normal" alarms we as police officers get upon arrival at a scene. The deputy exited the squad and did see an adult male and an adult female standing on a front porch outside the residence.

The location was a large two story older house that had been remodeled and was being used as a multi unit flophouse. It had seven or eight individual rooms that were rented out with a common kitchen, bathrooms and living area. The clientele living there were not at the high end of society. Many of the people living there had prior contacts with the local police for a wide variety of reasons.

Most deputies on the department knew the location well, as the department had been to the same location numerous times in the past for a wide variety of calls and or complaints.

With the squad parked midway up the driveway, the deputy began walking toward the porch, but the people who were on the

porch had gone into the residence. Two males appeared from the darkness coming from the area of the garage located at the back corner of the property. One of these two men would turn out to be an officers' worst nightmare come true.

Parked near the area of the garage where the two men came from was a minivan with fresh damage to the rear end and the back window broken out. The investigation would later reveal that the wife of the suspect was trying to leave prior to the physical altercation and had backed into a tree in the driveway and then parked the van near the garage.

The deputy continued to walk up the drive and made contact with one male who was the husband/suspect of the original 911 call. The second male walked away before the deputy could make contact or identify him.

The deputy asked the suspect for identification. The suspect was a white male, age 26, approximately 5'9", 175, well built and muscular, who we will call Robbie.

The deputy said Robbie was calm, cooperative, and gave no signs of resistance up to this point. The deputy observed what appeared to be fresh scratch marks on his neck. When asked about them, he said, "It was from the accident and there's no problem."

The initial conversation lasted no longer than two minutes. During the end of this initial conversation the deputy saw that Robbie had what the deputy thought was a handle of a knife with the blade stuck under the watchband on his left wrist. "Presumed Compliance"¹ had set in and rears its ugly head and will prove how great of a danger it becomes to any officer falling into its teeth.

Standing approximately two to three feet away from Robbie, the deputy told him, "I'm gonna need that knife," and began to reach for it. Robbie grabbed the knife and slashed the left side of the deputy's face, hit the deputy, knocking the deputy to the ground and immediately grabbed for the gun of the deputy. The deputy immediately called for assistance, turning away on the ground attempting to protect the weapon. As the

deputy reached for the holster to protect the weapon, it was gone.

The deputy was armed with a .357 magnum 6-shot revolver, which was carried in an older model level III-security holster that was very worn (*see photo 1*). This was one of a very few deputies who still carried a revolver. The department "grandfathered" those deputies who carried revolvers prior to



the current policy of only semi-automatics being allowed.

Robbie grabbed the deputy around the neck, shoved the gun into the back of the deputy's neck pushing downward and said, "I can paralyze you." The deputy heard a woman's voice (Robbie's wife) yelling at Robbie saying, "Just leave it alone," and, "Get out of here." The deputy was now a hostage.

The first backup deputy arrived on scene at approximately this time. With the hostage deputy's call for help, every officer within five miles from every jurisdiction was responding to assist.

The arriving backup deputy pulled directly into the driveway behind the first squad, exited with weapon drawn. Robbie was pulling his hostage up by the neck placing the hostage between him and the arriving backup officers. Robbie turned his attention toward the first arriving backup officer and fired his first shot in that direction. The officer radioed, "shots fired" and advised that a deputy had been taken hostage.

The backup officer began verbalizing with Robbie but to no avail. Robbie's wife went running up to the backup officer, grabbing, pulling and screaming not to hurt her husband (Robbie). She was a major problem to the deputy and had to be physically restrained and put into the back of a squad. While in the squad, she continued to

scream, yell, and kick and hit the windows of the squad.

The second arriving back up officer was the focus of Robbie's second shot (*see photo 2*). At this point the hostage began to count the shots fired by Robbie. Robbie pulled the



hostage up and began moving away toward the C - D² corner of the residence. This officer thought the round hit his squad and the officer immediately exited his squad and took a position of cover outside his squad.

Robbie continued pulling the hostage down the D side of the residence past the porch and to the C - D corner of the residence back near the garage. The hostage deputy had begun to talk to Robbie attempting to calm him. The deputy was talking quiet and calm while Robbie was yelling and screaming.

Robbie looking down the driveway as additional officers began to arrive at the scene. The second backup officer had moved to the opposite B - C corner of the residence when Robbie was moving down the D side of the house. As Robbie and the hostage came into view, the officer noticed the hostage had changed positions and was now down near the waistline of Robbie. The revolver was still pointed at the head of the hostage. The officer, who was armed with a .40 caliber Berreta model 96, took an aim for a head shot, fired, but missed (*see photo 3*). Robbie immediately spun around yelling, "Who the f*** is shooting at me? Robbie pulled the hostage back up in front of him and headed for the door on the porch, going inside.

Inside the residence were the following: one older male in a wheelchair, one family consisting of mother who was six months pregnant, father and their infant who was

in a baby seat, one elderly male, one adult female, and the 911 caller - a middle-aged female. Once Robbie came inside the residence, they took cover wherever they could at the time.

As Robbie entered the residence he was walking backwards and was dragging/pulling the hostage along with him. As they got inside the third shot was fired into the ceiling of the first floor and traveled through the floor of the second floor.

Additional officers were arriving and setting up a perimeter and radio traffic was just what you might think during a situation like this. Everyone was trying to talk and the adrenalin levels had spiked.

The SWAT team had been requested, paged out and was responding, but like most departments SWAT is not full-time, and most members would not arrive for thirty to forty-five minutes, even under this most extreme circumstance.

Once inside, Robbie started telling the hostage to take off the gun belt and asked if the hostage had a vest (Kevlar soft body armor) on. Robbie wanted the vest and the hostage began to unbutton the shirt, but started to talk to Robbie trying to calm him and get his mind off taking the equipment and vest. Robbie tried to get the belt off, but was unable to do so. The hostage began to remove items from the duty belt and throw them away so Robbie would not be able to

use them. Robbie did take a multi-tool off the duty belt and threw it on the floor and the fourth shot was fired. The OC spray was also removed. Robbie moved to the second floor and to a window on the driveway side of the house and was yelling outside at the officers on the perimeter. The screen was pushed out of the window at this time.

Sometime while on the second floor the fifth shot was fired, this time right next to the hostage's ear. Many inside are yelling and screaming and Robbie is becoming more agitated and scared.

Robbie begins to talk to the hostage about his kids and how he will never see them again and that he has messed up big time. Robbie talks about how he is a good father and loves his kids. He also talks about how bad all cops are and that they will hurt or kill him now. The hostage begins to talk to him again, telling him that they have never had contact and that this officer never mistreated him. Robbie then tells the hostage, "You took the oath to serve with your life."

Robbie then asked the hostages name and the hostage only gave a last name. The hostage asked Robbie what his name was and he said "Robbie." The hostage began to tell Robbie about the twelve-year-old daughter the deputy has and how important children are and that it's important to be a proud parent. The truth is the deputy/hostage did not have any children, but Robbie asked about children!

Robbie turned his attention back to the duty belt and wanted to know what was on the belt. By this time nothing of lethal value was left on the belt as the hostage had removed everything but the handcuffs. Robbie tried to get the cuffs out of the case but could not get the snap open. Robbie made a comment around this time of, "Cuff



me and shoot me," as the hostage continued to talk in a calm manner trying to resolve the situation.

Robbie and the hostage were upstairs when the last round in the pistol was fired. It was unknown to surrounding officers how many shots had been fired or if he had more ammunition. It was believed that Robbie had the

duty belt and the extra rounds from it, so the surrounding officers were unaware the weapon was actually out of ammunition.

Robbie then went back to the same window where the screen had been pushed out. The hostage grabbed one of two speed loaders and threw it out the window (see photo 4); it was unknown at the time that the second speed loader had fallen out on



the first floor sometime prior to them going upstairs. Robbie became angry once again and asked what was thrown out the window. Robbie started yelling and screaming again and threw the radio somewhere in the residence.

One officer on the perimeter saw Robbie come to one of the windows on the second floor. The officer had a .223 caliber patrol rifle and later said that I had a clear shot at Robbie, but did not see Robbie with a weapon and did not take a shot.

Robbie started pushing and shoving the hostage and looked the hostage in the eye telling the hostage that he respected the officer. He then pushed the hostage down the landing and began trying to get the Kevlar vest off. He told the hostage, "Rip your shirt off like your life depends on it." The hostage unbuttoned only two buttons and stopped and began to try to calm Robbie once again by talking calm and quiet to him.

Robbie did take the portable radio off the duty belt and actually made several short transmissions, which went unanswered due to the heavy volume of radio traffic. The hostage was able to grab the microphone at one point and attempted to tell those listening that Robbie was out of ammo, but this too went unheard.

Robbie and the hostage were on the first floor near the door by the porch. Officers on

the outside now had a very tight perimeter set up on the residence and more officers continued to arrive.

Initial responding officers, under the direction of a second shift deputy sheriff sergeant who happened to still be at the department when the incident started and who was a SWAT Team member gathered five officers and formed a reaction team and set up near the corner of the garage across from the porch and doorway (see photo 4). The team was comprised of officers from three different departments.

One of the reaction team members began to try to negotiate with Robbie who was yelling and screaming from the first floor near the door. Robbie was saying that he wanted to see his wife. The negoti-

ating officer had no formal negotiator training, but was being coached by the SWAT Team sergeant as needed. Robbie was told to put the gun down and release the deputy, but Robbie said that he was scared that they (the cops) would kill him. The dialog continued, but Robbie refused to release the hostage. Robbie continued to say that he wanted to see his wife.

The SWAT Commander along with another SWAT Team deputy with his K9 partner were the first SWAT Team members to arrive at the command post (CP). "Shots fired" was screaming over the radio as they arrived. Additional arriving officers from the sheriff's department and other surrounding agencies had established the CP down the road.

The SWAT Commander with the SWAT Team K9 deputy immediately began heading down the road to the scene. The SWAT Commanders plan was to team up with the SWAT Sergeant of the reaction team and another deputy of the reaction team who was a former SWAT Team member and enter the residence and attempt a hostage rescue.

At the scene, Robbie exited the door holding the hostage in front of him with the gun held to the head of the hostage. The hostage was limp, but surrounding officers were unable to get a clear shot due to the position-

ing of the hostage. Negotiations continued, telling Robbie to release the hostage and put the gun down. Robbie continued to yell he wanted his wife and was told that if he released the hostage, he could speak to his wife which Robbie responded, "Bulls**t."

Robbie loosened up his grip of the hostage and was reaching for a cigarette, and lowered the gun slightly from the head of the hostage. This allowed the moment the hostage needed to break from the hold and flee. The hostage twisted and pushed Robbie away and ran toward the road to one of the squads parked in the driveway. Robbie yelled at the hostage and scrambled back inside immediately.

Officers radioed that the hostage was free, but Robbie was still armed and had gone back inside. Officers were advised to get the hostage back to the CP immediately. The hostage was free, but the incident was not over.

The SWAT Commander and the SWAT K9 deputy arrived at the residence within seconds of the hostage breaking free. They ended up behind one of the now many squads parked in or near the driveway. Negotiations were still taking place and could be heard very clearly by all close to the residence. The K9 deputy was deployed to the area of the reaction team.

To the surprise of the SWAT Commander, a tap on the shoulder turned out to be the hostage. Asking if the hostage, now deputy once again, was OK, the deputy began immediately to give intelligence information to the SWAT Commander, saying Robbie was out of rounds, the speed loaders had been tossed out, the OC was somewhere downstairs and it was unknown how many people were in the house.

The SWAT Commander again asked and confirmed the deputy was OK. The deputy continued to give information about the suspect and the layout of the house. By this time, the SWAT Commander was escorting the deputy out of the hot zone and back to the CP. Once clear of the danger zone, they stopped and a rapid medical assessment was done to ensure the deputy had sustained no injuries.

Once at the CP the deputy was turned over to care of the Undersheriff³ and a SWAT TEMS⁴ and was transported to the local hospital for a thorough evaluation. A detective also met with the deputy and did a quick interview at the CP.

Officers at the scene were still negotiating with Robbie who remained on the first floor

near the door, but still out of sight. Officers on the perimeter began advising the CP that they were seeing other subjects moving inside the residence at several locations. Orders for Robbie to surrender continued.

One SWAT rifle team had arrived and was immediately deployed. 4 Additional SWAT members arrived were briefed, assigned as the entry/arrest team and deployed.

The negotiating officer continued to talk with Robbie telling him they would not hurt

him and that if he gave up they would let him see his wife. Robbie continued to say that he was a good father and husband. The negotiations continued and Robbie eventually calmed down and said, "I'm coming out, don't shoot me."

Robbie came out the door with both hands in the air, but was holding the pistol in his right hand. Robbie was asking for the cops to shoot and kill him, but still had his hands in the air and then dropped the pistol

on the ground and sat down on a chair on the porch. He continued to ask for his wife and was told that if he followed the orders of the officers he could see his wife. The negotiator was able to get him to cooperate and got Robbie to walk off the porch and was taken into custody.

Robbie was escorted to the CP, where he was allowed to speak to his wife as promised. He was thoroughly searched and taken away from the CP.

The scene was still not secure as the residence had to be cleared and searched for other possible victims. SWAT did make entry into the residence and controlled and escorted all those inside out of the residence. The investigation would now begin and the lessons learned would follow.

Some others things occurred during this incident that should also be brought to your attention.

While an officer from a nearby City PD was responding to the call for help, the officer lost control of their squad

and crashed. Injured but not willing to quit, jumped out of the squad, flagged down another responding squad and got to the scene. How many times have we heard, "If you don't get to the call, you don't do anyone any good?"

Living only 3 miles from the incident, the SWAT commander was the first arriving "off-duty" SWAT officer on scene, but due to department policy, the SWAT Commander had only SWAT uniform and two Kimber 1911's .45 autos with him. The remainder of equipment including Kevlar and M-4 were back at the office sitting in the squad assigned solely to the SWAT Commander, but not allowed to take home. Once at the scene the SWAT Commander did take an M4 and Kevlar from officers who were staged at the CP. "If you stay ready, you don't have to get ready!"⁵ Time is critical in many SWAT calls and departments need to take a close look at ensuring their SWAT officers have the tools they need with them.

Like any call involving more than one agency communications was an issue, but the officers did not let this affect the operation. Due to a variety of frequencies not all officers could use their portable radios once on scene. They communicated via a human projection modulator...they yelled at each other!

Several of the officers had patrol rifles, some with optics. One officer on the perimeter with a rifle with optics observed Robbie at one point in a second floor window and had clear sight alignment and a clear sight picture but did not observe the weapon in the hand of Robbie at the time. A shot was not taken. Having a thorough knowledge and understanding of "Intervention Options,"⁶ Deadly Force Justification and Imminent Threat criteria⁷ and "Tennessee Vs. Garner"⁸ the officer could have ended this situation with what would have been a legal, lawful and justifiable shot. More shots were fired after this took place.

Presumed Compliance and Reactionary Distance are two critical things you should consider concerning the initial responding deputy who violated both during the initial contact.

Presumed Compliance started from the moment the deputy exited the squad and saw Robbie walking calmly toward the squad. Once verbal contact with Robbie was made, Presumed Compliance set in deeper and was locked into the mind of the deputy as Robbie was cooperating with everything the deputy said or asked. Remember coop-

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eration and being truthful are two very different things.

The second big mistake was reactionary distance. This relates heavily back to the Presumed Compliance mistake since that had set in. The deputy felt that once the knife was seen and since Robbie had been “compliant,” stepping closer to take the knife would be no big deal. We all know the result of those two mistakes.

The deputy is well aware of those mistakes and is the first to admit it. In words directly from the deputy’s mouth, “I was stupid and screwed up.” No one is denying that, but what took place after being taken hostage speaks volumes for the tactical and survival mind set.

How many officers would have the mind set to throw away extra ammunition on your duty belt? Would you be able to remain calm

The most important lesson learned from the Robbie incident was to try to remain calm, as the deputy did while being held hostage. Short term or long term, being calm is the best path to follow.

and start to negotiate for yourself? During the incident, would you scream out to the fellow officers on the perimeter just how many rounds the guy shoving a gun into your ear has fired? Lower your center of gravity or go limp to give other officers a possible shot at guy threatening to kill you right then and there. Be able to talk to the bad guy and turn his attention away from getting your Kevlar off and killing you if you did not “rip it off like your life depended on it.” You just escaped from the most horrifying event of your life, being cut, hit, taken hostage and had a gun shoved in your ear, you still have the presence of mind to start telling the SWAT Commander tactical information seconds after you escaped.

These things far out number the mistakes made and are most likely the reason the deputy is alive today.

Let’s take a closer look at some the things done right. It is highly likely that the negotiation skills of the deputy were a primary reason the deputy survived. Many of us may have tried to strong arm our way out of the situation, and ended up shot. You need to

think about the “art” of negotiation before an event like this happens. This comes on two fronts, the deputy being taken hostage and the officer placed in the position of negotiating with Robbie at the scene.

The officer negotiating with Robbie had no formal negotiator training but did an incredible job under extreme circumstances. Although the SWAT Sergeant was coaching him much of the negotiation was done on his own. Should we be training all patrol officers in basic negotiation skills, more than just Verbal Judo⁹ or Professional Communications¹⁰ skills?

Negotiating for your own life – are you prepared? You will not have time to *wish* you had some type of negotiation training if you are ever taken hostage. Are you going to hope you say the right thing or find some training to KNOW you can say the right thing? The most important lesson learned from the Robbie incident was to try to remain calm, as the deputy did while being held hostage. Short term or long term, being calm is the best path to follow.

While remaining calm, try to deflect the anger away from you directly and put things into a personal perspective of the bad guy. Talking about your children as the deputy did, even though the deputy had no children, put a personal touch to the conversation, which Robbie could directly relate to.

Deflection also pulled the anger away when Robbie was trying to get the Kevlar from the deputy. Changing the subject, asking questions or as was done in this case, simply stop trying to redirect what is going on. “One hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the most skillful. Subduing the other’s military without battle is the most skillful.”¹¹

We have all heard the term used many times, warrior mind set, but how many of us really have that ingrained in our minds and are able to use those metal skills under critical circumstances? Would you have thought about throwing out your extra ammunition? You must remember that during this event Robbie had the gun jammed into the side of the deputy’s head or into the ear of the deputy.

Counting rounds fired and yelling to surrounding officers how many rounds have gone off proved the deputy had a warrior mind set. How does this show that kind of mind set you ask? Knowing your fellow officers are trying to help you and you know that they are under fire from your weapon, yet you keep your thoughts on the fight and

keep counting rounds. This may save not only your life, but also those officers outside. This also helped the deputy when the opportunity to escape rose.

The deputy did make mistakes, but made some very good decisions once taken hostage and which is why the deputy is alive. We must learn from incidents such as these for as Sun Tzu said in the Art of War -

“Knowing the other and knowing oneself, in one hundred battles no danger.

Not knowing the other and knowing oneself, one victory for one loss.

Not knowing the other and not knowing oneself, in every battle certain defeat.”¹² **TFI**

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Tom Hausner is a board member of Association of SWAT Personnel – Wisconsin, a former United States Marine and currently the SWAT Commander for the Walworth County (WI) Sheriff’s Department, with over 25 years of Law Enforcement experience. Tom is a graduate of the FBI National Academy, the IACP/Wisconsin Department of Justice Executive Development Course and Wisconsin State Patrol Academy Advanced Management Training Program. He has an extensive background in SWAT tactics and training. You may contact him by phone at (262) 741-7140 or by e-mail at thausner@co.walworth.wi.us.

ENDNOTES

1. Tony Blauer is founder and CEO of **BLAUER TACTICAL CONFRONTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS®**. Mr. Blauer has pioneered research and training methodologies that have influenced and inspired martial art & combative systems around the world.
2. NIMS – Target/house number system A – B – C – D with Side A being the street side and moving clockwise.
3. Undersheriff is the second in command on the department.
4. TEMS – Tactical Emergency Medical Service
5. Waukesha County (WI) basic SWAT school.
6. State of Wisconsin Intervention Options as of 06-21-06: Presence, Dialogue, Empty Hand Control, Intermediate Weapons and Deadly force
7. Wisconsin Department Justice Bureau of Training and Standards
8. TENNESSEE v. GARNER, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
9. George J. Thompson PhD – Founder and creator of **Verbal Judo, or Tactical Communications, is the gentle art of persuasion that redirects others behavior with words and generates voluntary compliance.**
10. State of Wisconsin Department of Justice - The Professional Communication Skills provides the tactical application of the basic Verbal Judo Program.
11. Sun Tzu – The Art of War.
12. Sun Tzu – The Art of War.



LIVE FIRE

Double Feed Drill

by Michael Sestack

Although the information and advice we have to share as professionals in the field of law enforcement can be repetitive, we needn't always dismiss other sources, as we may find a new twist on an old but still valuable concept. Recently, my department stumbled upon an interesting drill that developed by way of a broken extractor on a Glock model 22.

The extractor broke during live fire range drills with our C.E.R.T. team and caused several double feeds, a Phase 2 malfunction. I watched closely as the officer cleared this malfunction and continued with the drill. When the drill was over, the firearm was inspected, and the broken extractor was discovered to be the culprit behind the malfunctions. I noted that the officer worked his way through the malfunctions without hesitation. He didn't stop – he just diagnosed the issue and continued training, just as we wanted him to.

Then several thoughts hit me: would other officers do the same thing? Would they stop and look for help from the instructors? Or would they work their way through it and continue on? I decided to use this broken firearm as a training aid to see how well our malfunction drill training was working. I didn't replace the broken extractor, I left it the way it was and marked the firearm and the case we keep it in with orange tape then

placed it in a locked gun safe in our armory so it would not be accessible for duty use. It's important to make sure this step is completed – we wouldn't want to accidentally issue an inoperative firearm to an officer for duty use.

We are very careful to make sure that the only time this firearm is out of the safe is when the instructors take it to the range. When our officers attend the departments annual firearms training we have them go over Phase 1 and Phase 2 clearance drills. We use fairly standard Phase 1 and 2 clearance drills in our training with Phase 1's being cleared with the standard "TAP – RACK," progressing to Phase 2 using the "LOCK – RIP – WORK – CLEAR – TAP – RACK." In other words we LOCK the slide to the rear, RIP the magazine out, WORK the action several times to make sure the malfunction is CLEAR, and insert a fresh magazine with a TAP – RACK.

We have our officers do this using dummy rounds until they appear to have mastered the concept and do it without any supervision. All the officers must be able to do this before progressing to the next stage of training.

After the classroom training is completed, the officers move to the range for live fire drills and qualifications (firearms skills assessment). This is where the firearm with

the broken extractor comes in. We use it for Live Fire Double Feed Drills or Live Fire Phase 2 clearance drills, whichever you prefer.

The instructors have one officer come to the firing line, usually the 7 to 10 yard line, where the officer is given the firearm with the broken extractor, told to insert a magazine with live ammo in the firearm, charge and go to the low ready position. The officer is then told to concentrate on the fundamentals and to slowly fire all the rounds in the magazine, trying to fire the tightest group possible. If a malfunction occurs they are to work their way through it by themselves (the instructors are to keep a close watch on the officer, watching for safety issues).

This is basically an accuracy drill set up to determine if the officer has an understanding of the fundamentals such as sight alignment, sight picture, trigger control and trigger re-set. If a malfunction occurs (and the instructors know it will due to the broken extractor) the officer is to work their way through it by themselves just as they would have to in a real deadly force confrontation on the streets. Remember, we will perform just as we train, if we train our officers to raise their hands to have the instructor clear the malfunction, they are likely going to do if the same thing should the pistol malfunction on the street. That's right, officers have been

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known to stop and raise their hands in the middle of a gunfight when a malfunction occurs because that's the way they have been trained to do it on the range.

We had 137 correctional officers on the range over a 3-week period. The following is a list of things that some of them did wrong during the LIVE FIRE DOUBLE FEED DRILL.

1. Tap and rack repeatedly, never removing the magazine and clearing the firearm until told to do so.
2. Asking the instructor what to do.
3. Removing the magazine without locking the slide to the rear, this caused the slide to close on the already fired round, the officer then re-inserted the same magazine with a TAP but no RACK and tried to fire the already fired round that he failed to CLEAR from the firearm.
4. Doing the same as mentioned above but re-inserting the magazine with a TAP and RACK which created another double feed due to not clearing the already fired round from the chamber by working the slide several times to CLEAR it.
5. Holding the firearm in the strong hand (good) while trying to work the slide with the support hand that also had a magazine in it at the same time (bad).
6. Forgetting to re-insert a magazine after clearing the action, attempting to then fire another round. Hearing a "click" (firing pin falling on an empty chamber) the officer then did a Phase 1 clearance for a misfire (TAP - RACK) several times without once remembering to re-insert a live magazine, until told to do so.
7. Dropping magazines on the ground with live rounds in them.
8. Attempting to work the slide by grasping it in the middle, effectively covering the ejection port making it impossible to clear the weapon and one officer "pinched" their pinky finger in the ejection port doing this, causing another type of malfunction.
9. Attempting to work the slide by grasping it from the very front, covering the muzzle with part of their hand.
10. Placing the magazine the officer just removed from the weapon in their mouth.

As you can see, several of the mental malfunctions the officers exhibited during this Live Fire Double Feed drill were cause for alarm. Several times the instructors had to step in for safety reasons. One thing I forgot to mention above was that some of the officers had to be reminded to take their finger out of the trigger guard while performing this drill. None of these "mental malfunctions" were exhibited during training with dummy rounds.

It was only when we progressed to the Live Fire Double Feed Drills that these mental malfunctions became apparent. If this is how officers react under the stress of training on the range, how are they going to perform under the stress of a real life deadly force encounter? Since most of our issue pistols are boringly reliable, perhaps you might consider a modification to a spare that would force malfunctions, thus giving the officer a more realistic training scenario.

We perform the way we train. We must train for real world encounters, and our officers have to react on "auto-pilot". There is no such thing as "enough training" - we must always continue to be our best.

Train hard, Stay safe. **TFI**

Picatinny vs. Weaver Rail Systems

While attending the 2007 High Liability Trainers Conference in Jacksonville Florida, I heard a very good explanation of the firearms rail systems currently in use and a good rule of thumb concerning their use on police weapons. The systems are Picatinny and Weaver.

The two systems are for all practical purposes identical to the naked eye depending on the quality of the manufacturing process. The profiles of the systems are very close indeed. The major difference lies in the placement and width of the recoil grooves.

The 1913 MIL-STD Picatinny grooves are .206 inches wide and have a centered width of .394 inches. These measurements being consistent with the MIL-STD specifications.

The Weaver system uses a .180 groove and does not have a consistent center to center measurement from one groove to the other. The Weaver system usually has a specific sight or scope it is machined for so that interchangeability is not an issue as it is in a military application.

For Law Enforcement purposes we should adhere to the MIL-STD Picatinny rail system since we require the same uniformity and ability to change to different sighting systems for different applications. We in Law Enforcement, like the Military, use many types of lasers, gun-mounted lights, scopes, and red/green dot sights. Therefore the military uniformity in the recoil grooves of the Picatinny rail system allows us the flexibility we need.

The rule of thumb is basically this. Accessories set up for a Weaver system will in most cases fit a Picatinny rail, but a Picatinny application will probably not work well on a Weaver rail. Erring on the side of caution then, when making purchases of equipment, the Weaver rail system should be passed over in favor of the Picatinny.

I say leave nothing to chance. Let the Picatinny stay Military and Law Enforcement and leave the Weaver system for the specific applications for which it was intended. **TFI**

Layne E. Schultetus
Member, IALEFI® Board of Directors

DOWNED OFFICER AND CITIZEN RESCUES: LIVE-FIRE TRAINING

BY JASON WUESTENBERG

One of the greatest breakthroughs in law enforcement training was the creation and implementation of force-on-force training weapons and marking cartridges, such as Simunition. The ability to train against a live adversary has without a doubt improved the quality of training and increased the chances for surviving, and better yet, prevailing in a deadly force encounter.

The one aspect I think force-on-force training does not address adequately, and I believe is a huge component in an armed confrontation, is confidence. I don't mean confidence in terms of improving individual skill level. I'm talking about the confidence of doing the task at hand correctly when real bullets start flying.

Officers know that during force-on-force training, when proper safety protocols have been followed, no one will get hurt with live

ammunition. With force-on-force training, the emphasis is placed on decision-making skills and proper implementation of principles and tactics. Critical mistakes, such as weapon-handling skills and unawareness of other officer's line of fire, are more likely to occur. However, because it is a training environment and that is where we prefer to have mistakes occur, it is often treated as a training issue. And, although the officer may know what they did wrong, do they gain the confidence to know they will do it right when the situation is for real?

Since force-on-force has dominated the training philosophy, live-fire training has taken a back seat when it comes to teaching patrol team tactics. Live-fire is obviously still used for basic and advanced marksmanship training, as well as individual tactics training, but teaching team tactics seems to be reserved for force-on-

force training. This is probably due to the decrease in risk and liability compared to live-fire training, and that is understandable. But, are we giving officers the "full training package" that can be offered?

The most ideal training package to have for this type of training, or any tactical training for that matter, is to first start off with dry-fire practice so everyone understands the principles and tactics. Then, move to force-on-force training to validate the principles and tactics against an armed suspect and work out any problems that arise, especially if they will be a factor for live-fire training. Finally, conduct live-fire training to give your officers the confidence to perform the task when real bullets are in play.

There are some training topics that are obviously hard to replicate on a live-fire range. But, a critical life-saving operation,



such as downed officer or citizen rescue, can easily be done on a live-fire range.

One aspect of downed officer rescue that is often overlooked is learning how to carry a human body. This is often overlooked because some training aid, such as a mannequin, is used to represent a down officer. Although I understand this philosophy for live-fire training, I have also seen this done during force-on-force training. Nothing represents carrying a human body like carrying an *actual human body*. This is where you validate what really works and what doesn't. This should be done for both force-on-force training *and* live-fire training.

Putting a live body down range for live-fire training can be a scary idea for a lot of people, including students and administrators. But, here is my philosophy, and I'm sure there are others out there who share in it as well. If instructors are not willing to conduct this training in a controlled environment, then they can not expect officers to perform the task successfully in an uncontrolled environment. Putting a live body down range is not a big deal. If your tactics will put your live body in danger for live-fire training, then it is probably not a good tactic for a real-world situation. Unsafe and impractical tactics should already have been identified and eliminated before doing live-fire training.

There are various tactics associated with downed officer rescues, so I am not going to address them. However, I am going to talk about some basic principles for conducting downed officer rescues because they are relevant to setting up safe live-fire training.

For open area rescues, one important

principle to remember is that the rescue team should approach from a direction that does not place the downed officer between the rescue team and the suspect's location. If bullets start flying between the rescue team and suspect, then the downed officer is right in the middle of it. This type of approach also results in the rescue team having to spend additional time to maneuver around the downed officer or to step over the downed officer, which can cause officers to trip over the downed officer or cause further injury to the downed officer.

For range training, there are two ways you can set this up, and they both represent the same thing. For the first option, place your downed officer at about the 15 yard line, in line with your target. Then, have your rescue team start at about the 30 yard line,

but offset them to the left or right about 10 – 15 yards. This keeps the downed officer out of the line of fire. Have the team make a direct approach to the target. The team should advance past the 15 yard line (where your downed officer is), then move over to position themselves between the target and downed officer. Then, after picking up the downed officer, the team can withdraw straight back. The instructor should be located on the side of the team closest to the downed officer the entire time to call "cease fire", if needed. At any point during this drill, the instructor can give a "threat" command to initiate an engagement with the target.

The second option is to have your rescue team start in line with the target at the 30 yard line, and have your downed officer (at the 15 yard line) offset left or right about 10 – 15 yards. The end result is the same. The downed officer is out of the line of fire and the team's movement.

I like the first option better only because it forces officers to think about where they should start from to keep the downed officer out of the line of fire. It helps minimize the "square range" mentality because officers are not walking down range in-line with the target they are engaging.

There might be a tendency to have the rescue team move slowly when conducting this type of live-fire training, for safety concerns. However, after completing the drill once or twice at a slow pace, the students should feel a little more comfortable about doing the live-fire drill. Now the instructor needs to have the rescue team execute the drill at the speed they would do it on the street. In a real-world situation, we wouldn't



IF IT ISN'T SAFE TO DO ON THE RANGE, THEN IT ISN'T SAFE TO DO IN THE REAL WORLD.




take all day to reach the downed officers and extract them from the threat area. So, we shouldn't take all day during training either. Keep in mind, the officers should have conducted dry runs and force-on-force training before getting to this point. So, instructors are not teaching this tactic for the first time under live-fire conditions. The tactics should be well-known and understood. At this point, it's about getting the repetitions in under live-fire conditions to build confidence in their abilities and knowledge.

There are other issues to consider in terms of tactics, such as the use of ballistic shields for rescues, whether the cover officers should be shoulder-to-shoulder or separated to present a "two front war" to the suspect, whether you should use a patrol rifle operator in a stationary position for cover fire, etc. Regardless, whatever it is you teach, be sure to do it under live-fire conditions. If it isn't safe to do on the range, then it isn't safe to do in the real world. Train hard, and hope you never have to use it. Stay safe! **TFI**


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jason Wuestenberg has been a Police Officer for the Phoenix Police Dept. (AZ) since 1994. Jason has been assigned to the Training Bureau as a firearms & tactics instructor since 2000. Jason is also the Owner of Pro-Active Training Institute. Jason can be reached at jason.wuestenberg@phoenix.gov or through his company web site at www.pro-activetraining.us.


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
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OPTION 2 DRILL



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INVOLUNTARY FIREARMS DISCHARGE – DOES THE FINGER OBEY THE BRAIN?

Christopher Heim, Eckhard Niebergall & Dietmar Schmidtbleicher

It was 2.30 a.m. In search of a fleeing suspect, Officer J. had parked his car and was standing in a dark backyard, his service weapon drawn. He was contemplating going back to his vehicle for his flashlight when suddenly he saw a shadow move about five yards in front of him. At that exact moment he was blinded by a flash of light that was immediately followed by a loud noise.

When questioned afterwards, Officer J. could only recall raising his arms to protect himself from the light. It was only when he counted the shells in his gun that he noticed that the loud noise he had heard after the flash had been his own gun going off. Thankfully no one had been injured – the projectile had hit a shed on the other side of the yard.

The shadow that had startled officer J. turned out to have been a 14-year old boy, who testified that he had always wanted to take a photograph of “a policeman in action” (first published in the German Polizeitrainer-Magazin 2/1998, page 10).

Over the past few years' incidents of involuntary discharges of police firearms – as described above – have been a cause of growing concern throughout Germany. In the early 1990s several police officers were prosecuted for injuring or even killing suspects by involuntarily discharging their weapons in the line of duty. Since 1999, at least four more suspects have been killed by involuntary discharges from police firearms. In 2001, a policeman accidentally killed his colleague when his weapon went off as they left a building *after* they had searched it for intruders. In the United States of America, similar incidents have been reported: in an article published in 1997, Edward Tully, currently Executive Director of NEIA, lists eleven cases of officers killing or injuring suspects, colleagues or even themselves by unintentionally discharging their firearm. Even earlier, Geller and Scott (1992) report 62 unintentional discharges by NYPD officers in 1990 alone. In a more recent article published in the Washington Post in 2002, O'Brien describes three unintentional discharges in Onondaga County (NY), one of these happening to one of the most experienced officers in the depart-

ment: a firearms instructor unintentionally fired a hole through a classroom wall while teaching a class how to remove a weapon from the holster.

Not all incidents of involuntary firearms discharges are subject to court cases; often enough, the bullet will – luckily – go astray and for example “get stuck in the door frame”, not harming anyone. However, in some incidents – at least in Germany – police officers have been sentenced as a result of such unfortunate events. For example, in 1995 three police officers were called to investigate a possible burglary at three a.m. in the morning. One officer stood alone with his weapon drawn in a dark backyard while two colleagues entered the house to search for the intruder. When the suspect saw the policemen entering the building, he climbed out of a window on the second floor and tried to slide down the drain pipe. Unfortunately for him, the drain pipe gave way and he fell from about five metres height. The officer, startled by the loud sound, looked up to see a shadow falling towards him and raised his hands in protection...the bullet passed through the suspect's neck while he was still in mid-air. The officer was sentenced to a

fine of 8000 Deutschmarks because of negligent homicide.

This court sentence is an example of consequences officers had to face only a dozen years ago when charged with injuring or killing suspects (or innocent bystanders) by involuntarily discharging their firearms. Due to the dearth of information about the mechanisms that may underlie such incidents, prosecutors and defence lawyers alike were confronted with the same question: is it indeed possible to involuntarily overcome the trigger pull (which usually lies between four and six pounds) of a standard police weapon?

In an effort to find answers to this question Professor Dr. Roger Enoka, one of the most renowned sports physiologists and director of the Human Performance Research Laboratories in Arizona (USA), was invited to testify in a court case held in Frankfurt, Germany in 1995. Professor Enoka was one of the first researchers to examine the circumstances under which involuntary firearms discharges may occur. Based on a review of relevant literature he not only confirmed the possibility of involuntarily discharging a firearm, but also offered expla-

nations of their possible causes: involuntary discharges, Enoka proposed, may result from involuntary muscle contractions in the hand holding a firearm. All human movements (and thus also the flexion of the index finger when pulling a trigger), so Enoka, are based on muscle contractions, which are generally caused by a direct command from the brain (known as a voluntary contraction). However, muscles can also be activated by signals that arise from other locations within the nervous system besides the brain, and such activation may produce a muscle contraction that is not the result of a conscious decision. This is especially likely to occur when the human body has to react quickly to an unexpected incident, for instance (as is illustrated at the outset) a light flashing directly in front of an individual. According to Enoka, there are three scenarios that can elicit involuntary muscle contractions that are sufficiently strong to bring about the involuntary discharge of a firearm: sympathetic contractions, loss of balance and startle reaction.

The term sympathetic contraction refers to the fact that an involuntary contraction may occur in the muscles of one limb when the same muscles in the other limb are performing an intended forceful action. In physiology literature this effect is known as a mirror movement, with the intensity of the sympathetic contraction depending on the amount of force exerted during the intended action. In policing, a common situation that may evoke such a sympathetic contraction would be, for example, a law enforcement officer attempting to restrain a struggling suspect with one hand while holding a handgun in the other.

The second scenario described by Enoka involves loss of balance. When balance is disturbed the human body evokes rapid involuntary contractions to return itself to a position of equilibrium. Thereby the involuntary contractions used to prevent a fall depend on the options available to counteract the disturbance of balance. Usually, compensatory movements following gait perturbations primarily involve correcting movements of the lower limbs to keep the body in balance, whereas movements of the arms are restricted to their extension forwards as a safeguard to counter an eventual fall. When an individual is holding a handle for support, there is, however, a tendency to use the arm muscles to maintain balance rather than the leg muscles. Under such circumstances the focal point of automatic postural activity is

any contact point an individual has with his or her surroundings. In other words, if an individual's posture is disturbed while grasping an object, for instance a handgun, he or she is likely to grasp it more forcefully.

Startle reaction, the third scenario identified by Enoka, is a whole-body reflex-like response to an unexpected stimulus, possibly a loud noise. It evokes rapid involuntary contractions that begin with the blink of an eye and spread to all muscles throughout the body. The reaction of the hands occurs less than 200ms after the stimulus and leads to individuals clenching their fists. Enoka concludes: "Accordingly, an officer who is startled by a loud, unexpected noise while searching for a suspect with his weapon drawn would surely increase the grip force on the weapon, perhaps enough to cause an involuntary discharge."

However, no matter how feasible Enoka's explanations may have been and no matter to what extent they were corroborated by analyses of involuntary discharges (for instance by Tully, see above), they were not able to unequivocally answer the central question asked in German courtrooms: is it indeed possible to involuntarily overcome the trigger pull of a standard police weapon? The judges criticized that there was no empirical evidence that supported Enoka's theories, namely that involuntary muscle contractions brought about by neurological connections between limbs may indeed result in sufficient force being produced in the hand carrying a firearm to involuntarily overcome the trigger pull of a standard police service weapon. Moreover, there was a second question left unanswered: German police regulations unambiguously stipulate that when holding a gun, the index finger has always to be placed *outside* the trigger guard and may only be placed on the trigger when a *conscious* decision to fire has been taken. If these regulations were adhered to, incidents of involuntary discharge should be impossible.

During his stay in Germany, Professor Enoka met with Eckhard Niebergall, president of the German Police Trainers Association (Polizeitrainer in Deutschland e.V.) and Professor Dr. Dietmar Schmidtbleicher, also a sports physiologist like Enoka and Head of the Department of Human Movement Science at the University of Frankfurt. At this time, Professor Schmidtbleicher's department possessed one of the few laboratories in Germany that had the means of empirically validating the theories proposed




Figure 1: Attachment of the force sensing resistors on the back of the hand-stock.

Figure 2: Attachment of the force sensing resistors on the trigger and fastening of the sensors with tape.



by Enoka. Thus, with the aim of setting the jurisdiction regarding cases of involuntary firearms discharge on solid grounds, a research program was initiated.

For their research, Professor Schmidtbleicher's team fixed force sensing resistors to the handstock and trigger of a pistol (see Figures 1 and 2 above), and asked 34 randomly chosen police officers to react to a set case. During the trial the force sensors implemented in the trial apparatus made it possible to register any changes in pressure exerted on the firearm by the participating officers. The results suggested that, despite the above mentioned regulations stipulating to keep the index finger away from the trigger *at all times* unless they are ready to fire, police officers may – in certain situations – not only make contact with the trigger, but that this contact may even go unnoticed: despite force readings registered by the sensors during the trial and video footage of the incidents clearly showing that seven of the 34 participating officers




Figure 3: Example of a force-time-curve registered for a participating officer in study one. From top to bottom: force exerted on the back of the handstock, force exerted on the trigger. The y-axis shows the electrical signal (in volts) registered by the force sensors, the x-axis shows the timeline of the trial.

(20.6%) had laid their index finger on the trigger at some point during the scenario, *all* participants, when questioned after the trial, maintained that they had not made contact with the trigger. Moreover, none of the participating officers could give any particulars about the force exerted on the hand stock, even though a noticeable increase in the amount of pressure exerted was registered (see Figure 3 above).

With this knowledge that police officers may indeed not consciously make contact with the trigger during critical incident situations in mind, Professor Schmidtbleicher's team turned their attention to empirically validating the assumptions made by Enoka, namely that involuntary discharges may be the result of unintended muscle contractions. For this study, 25 participants (13 women and 12 men between 21 and 39 years of age) were asked to perform a series of trials that necessitated specific movements of only one limb while holding a pistol fixed with force sensing resistors (see Figure 4 below). These sensors recorded changes in the pressure exerted on the firearm during

the trial, making it possible to unequivocally determine if and to what extent activity in particular limbs may lead to an increase in the pressure exerted on the gun. The results clearly indicate that motor activity in other limbs may indeed lead to a significant increase in the force exerted on a firearm (see Figures 5 and 6 at right) and that the resulting pressure on the trigger can be sufficient to (involuntarily) overcome the trigger pull of most police weapons (see Table 1). These findings not only validated the theories proposed by Enoka, but, in doing so, also provided scientific evidence of the fact that it is indeed possible for police officers to *involuntarily* discharge a weapon in the line of duty.

Throughout Germany, at least, the findings had a significant impact on legal proceedings: in 1999, based on the statements made by Professor Schmidtbleicher and Eckhard Niebergall, a judge was prepared, for the first time, to consider the possibility of an involuntary discharge as mitigating circumstances for an officer impeached of killing a suspect when his gun went off dur-

ing a struggle.

These important findings have resulted in a continued scientific interest, in both involuntary discharges and also in policing more generally. Thus, an exceptionally well resourced collaborative study between the police force of the German state Hesse and the University of Frankfurt is currently underway which intends to shed further light onto factors of gun handling during everyday police work. Aims of the study are thus not only to gain an even better understanding of the mechanisms that may lead to involuntary discharges, but also to get a better insight into tactical situations in general: are there – apart from the factors described by Enoka and empirically validated by Professor Schmidtbleicher's team – further factors that may increase the likelihood of involuntarily firing a gun? For example, what roles do cognition and perception play in cases of involuntary firearms discharge? More generally speaking: how do police officers perceive tactical situations, and to what extent are they limited in their ability to make use of sensory information appropriately? Moreover, do work experience, training experience and/or rank have any influence how officers cope with dangerous situations or how officers handle their firearms – and if so, in what way?

For this study, a unique measuring device was constructed by installing a number of sensors into a standard service weapon (see Figure 7 at right). This weapon enables the scientists to register in real time the forces exerted on the handstock and the trigger, as well as record the current position of the trigger (i.e. the extent to which it has been pulled) and the horizontal and vertical position of the weapon (the direction, in which the weapon is aiming). Equipped with this




Figure 4: Trial settings in Study two.




Figure 5: Exemplary force-time-curve registered in the trial “jump” in comparison to the forces reached when actually firing the weapon. From top to bottom: force exerted on the trigger, force exerted on the front of the handstock, force exerted on the back of the handstock. The bottom graph shows the trigger signal, marking the contact with the force plate.




Figure 6: Mean force values for all participants registered at the back of the hand stock in the different trials in comparison to holding the gun when not performing a trial (reference value).




Figure 7: Force sensing resistors embedded in the handstock. The sensors were subsequently disguised.

Trial	n	uncocked	cocked
jump both legs submax	10	1	2
jump both legs max	10	3	3
jump ipsilateral submax	10	0	1
jump ipsilateral max	8	0	1
jump kontralateral submax	10	1	2
jump kontralateral max	10	1	1
bar pull	13	0	3
bar push	11	0	2
balance	12	1	4
pulley pull	13	0	2
pulley push	13	0	2
kick ipsilateral	11	1	3
kick contra lateral	13	1	3
Total	144	9	29

Table 1: Number of participants exceeding the pistol’s release values for a cocked (trigger pull of 56.9 Newton) and uncocked (trigger pull of 22 Newton) weapon during the trials. At each trial the number of participants exceeding the release values at least once was counted as one, irrespective of the number of times a participant exceeded his personal release value. As mentioned in the text, a number of participants took their finger of the trigger during the trial. Thus, the table reads as follows: in the trial “jumping on both legs sub maximally”, 10 (n) participants kept their finger on the trigger, of which one exerted enough pressure on the trigger to release a shot from an uncocked weapon, one further participant (adding up to two) exerted enough pressure to release a shot from a cocked weapon.

Figure 8: Example of the measurement values registered for a participating officer. From top to bottom: force exerted on the trigger, force exerted on the handstock, current position of the trigger, vertical and horizontal movement of the weapon, participant’s heart rate, trigger signal, timeline in seconds.






Figure 9: Trigger contacts by group during the trial.




Figure 10: Comparison of the number of trigger contacts registered by the force sensing resistors with the statements given by participating officers when questioned after the trial. The bottom table shows the results of the measurements (second line) in comparison with the officer's statements in the questionnaire (third line). Identical colors symbolize concurrence between the officer's statements in the questionnaire and the analysis of video footage.

measuring device, 260 officers of different ages, gender, ranks and with different years of service and training experiences took part in a training scenario in the Hesse State Police Academy in Wiesbaden, Germany. In this training scenario (see the adjoining box), participating officers were individually confronted with a set case with an identical number of suspects, together with comparable auditory disturbances. During the training simulation the sensors installed in the weapon recorded the pressure participants exerted on the hand-stock, whether they made contact with the trigger with their index finger and, if so, to which degree the trigger was pulled and in which position the weapon was held. Additionally, participants' heart rates were monitored. All data were transferred to a computer by means of a telemetrical device (see Figure 8). Additionally, the situation was recorded with cameras from three different angles, allowing not only for retrospective comparison of the recorded data with the

actual event, but also for an evaluation of the course of action each participant took during the setting. After going through the scenario participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire relating to their subjective experience of the operation.

First results of this study – based on the analysis of 66 participating officers – have been presented at the European Police Trainers Conference in Nuremberg, Germany (March 2006) and Jane's Annual Less Lethal Weapons Conference in Leeds, UK (October 2006). These are subsequently summarized.

The 66 officers analyzed to date can be divided into four different groups:

- 14 entrant officers who had started their training three weeks prior and thus had no weapons training whatsoever (mean age 21.7 ± 2.9 years)
- 19 officers in training at the end of their second year in the police school (mean age 21.3 ± 2.3 years)
- 22 regular officers on patrol duty (mean age 37.6 ± 8.9 years, mean duration on the force 17.6 ± 10.7)
- 11 officers belonging to Special Forces (SEK, MEK, PS) (mean age 30.2 ± 3.5 years, mean duration on the force 8.6 ± 4.8 years)

The first noticeable result is that in all groups a majority of officers placed their index finger inside the trigger guard at some point in the scenario *without actually firing the gun* (a few officers even had permanent contact with the trigger during the full length of the trial), thus violating police regulations to keep the finger off the trigger until a decision to fire has been taken, with the highest proportion – perhaps unsurprisingly – being reached in the group of the entrant officers who had not yet received any weapons training (see Figure 9 at left). Analysis of the questionnaires filled out by the officers after the trial also confirmed that this violation of police rules appeared to occur nonconsciously: only very few participants were able to correctly give information about the position of their index finger during the trial (Figure 10, left, exemplarily shows the answers given by the group of officers on patrol duty).

Even though only about a quarter of the data from participating officers have been analyzed to date, the results already offer new insights into the occurrence of incidents of involuntary discharge. During the scenario, four of the 66 participating officers (one out of each "trainee" group and two out of the group of officers on patrol duty) fired their weapon at a point in which there was no obvious threat either for themselves or for the lives of others: in all four cases the officers shot just after the second suspect had stepped out of the bank but *before* he had pulled his weapon. In all four cases the officer stood at least five meters away from either suspect at the time of the shooting, and in all four cases the officer shot in an immediate response (less than 300ms after) to the startle stimulus (the gun being fired by a trainer behind his or her back). Furthermore, in all four cases the officer had his or her index finger lying on the trigger immediately prior to the startle stimulus occurring.

It is unclear, however, what exactly caused the officers to fire since none of the three scenarios described by Enoka (sympathetic contractions, loss of balance or the physiological human startle reaction) appear to be applicable to the situation: none of the participants lost their balance at any time in the scenario, at no time did the officers forcefully use any other limb when holding the gun in their hand and in only one of the four cases (and even then only after repeatedly viewing the videotape of the scene in slow motion) could the whole-body reflex-like response in reaction to the unexpected stimulus (the shot fired behind the back of the officer) described by Enoka be found.

These results lend support to the notion described above that there are further factors that could “contribute” to involuntary discharges of police firearms. First clues concerning what these may be are to be found in the questionnaires filled in by the participants after the trial: in the questionnaire, one of the four officers wrote that he had fired at “the man with the gun”, another justified his action by stating that “the third man came out of the bank and shot”. Both statements are verifiably inaccurate: in both cases, the second suspect had not even drawn his weapon at the time the officer fired. This suggests that the officer’s inaccurate perception may have been the cause for his (wrongful) actions. At the same time, the question must be asked how well officers are in fact able to accurately report on what has happened: there is sufficient data in scientific literature that shows that humans are not very good at reporting on their mental states. In other words: when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes leading to their response to certain stimulus, they often do not do this on the basis of any

true introspection. Instead, their reports may be based on a priori judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus *may* have been the cause for their action: the statements made in the questionnaire may be the result of the officers trying to make sense of and/or justify their actions for themselves *after* the event. This will be a key issue to look at in the further analysis. **TFI**

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CASE DESCRIPTION:

The trial was conducted in the interactive training centre at the Hesse State Police Academy in Wiesbaden, Germany. This features a realistic reconstruction of a street in the city of Wiesbaden with a hotel, a restaurant and two banks.

Before the trial, participating officers were given a general description of the situation they were about to encounter: “You are on your beat in the streets of Wiesbaden together with your partner, an officer in training. Your call sign is NERO 13/01” (the role of the officer in training was played by an instructor). Immediately prior to entering the scenario, this description was specified as follows: “NERO 13/01. We have just received a distress call from a man named Rücker. Mr. Rücker lives in the Aunelstreet beside the Bank of Nassau. He has in-formed us that a man was shot in front of his house. We have no further information on the culprit other than he is about 1,90m tall and is dressed in a dark jacket. He is armed with either a pistol or a revolver. A backup and an ambulance are underway. Be cautious.”

Upon entering the scenario, the officers first see a woman lying on the floor about ten meters (twelve yards) in front of them crying for help (Figure 11, Picture 1). When addressed by the officer, the woman will tell him that she has been shot at and wounded by a man dressed in dark clothes and that this man has fled “around the corner”. If questioned further, the woman will only repeat what she has said, thus rendering no further information to the officer. At the same time, a second person lying around the corner (and thus not visible for the officer) will begin to cry for help, drawing the officer away from the injured woman and around the corner. When turning the corner, the officer sees a man kneeling with his back towards him (first suspect) over an obviously injured second person, who is lying on the ground about seven meters (8-9 yards) away from the officer.

When addressed by the officer, the man turns round and stands up (Figure 11, Picture 2), exposing a knife in his right hand but otherwise offering no threat to the officer and obviously willing to talk. During the ensuing “conversation”, a man dressed in dark clothes and wearing a mask (second suspect) steps out of the neighboring bank, clearly showing his *empty* hands (Figure 11, Picture 3). At the same moment, in order to startle the officer, a gun is fired *behind the officer’s back* by an instructor. The second suspect starts to shout at the first suspect with menacing gestures. To

underline this, he pulls a gun out of his pocket and holds it, clearly visible for the officer, in *low-ready position* pointing in the direction of the first suspect. When addressed, the second suspect immediately turns towards the officer (gun still in the *low-ready position*) and threatens to kill him (eventually pointing his gun directly at the officer) so that the officer is forced to shoot to save him- or herself. Thereafter, the scenario is continued until the officer has secured the first suspect (Figure 11, Picture 4) and gained control of the situation.



Figure 11: Description of the training scenario. Top left (1): The officer entering the scenario. Top right (2): The officer turns the corner and addresses the first suspect. Bottom left (3): The second suspects steps out of the bank with his hands raised and empty. Bottom right (4): Scene after the exchange of fire. The persons wearing the yellow jerseys do not play a part in the scenario.



"THE EVOLUTION OF TERROR TACTICS"

TEXT BY HOWARD LINETT, ESQ.

Understanding how terrorist attack tactics evolve will greatly benefit your defense efforts. There exists a "back and forth" as the terrorists develop, perfect and refine their attacks and we develop, perfect and refine our defenses to such attacks. This ongoing, dynamic and especially creative process is a virtual evolution, progressing success-to-success and failure-to-failure of both attackers and defenders.

The terrorists are proactive. We are reactive. Worse, the terrorists' tactics are the product of more than fifty years of evolution. They can employ what worked well for them two generations ago and for most of us it will be new, and take us by surprise...once. Thus will our evolution

of tactics begin. But one need neither wait until attacked nor become a history scholar to develop a sense of the direction in which the evolutionary process is headed.

The French Hill Traffic Intersection has suffered more attacks any other location in Israel. The Arab neighborhood of *Beit Hanina* borders the intersection providing easy access and escape to terrorist attackers. The intersection is on the main route to the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea so it is always packed with vehicles, hitchhikers and folks waiting at the intersection's half-dozen bus stops. It truly is a target rich environment for terrorists and a tactics evolution laboratory for us.

1. IN THE BEGINNING, terrorists plowed

vehicles into the crowds waiting at the intersection for buses. The bus stops were placed one on top of the other. Armed survivors began treating fleeing Arab drivers as terrorists to be shot rather than as incompetents to be held for police. Some frail metal railings were erected between the road and the bus stops.

2. UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS a terrorist with an AK-47 slithered the ten yards down the hillside from *Beit Hanina* into the gully along the Route #1 highway exit to the French Hill intersection. At first light he fired into several passing passenger cars then fled into *Beit Hanina*. A floodlight was erected illuminating the area of the highway from which the terrorist fired.

Border Police began an infrequent patrol of the area.

3. ONE WEEK LATER, same location, same attack. A closed circuit TV camera (CCTV) was installed overlooking the area. The frequency of the Border Police patrol was increased.

4. A TERRORIST WITH AN AK-47 hid in the bushes on a wall forming the *Beit Hanina* side of the intersection. As a bus started to depart he fired into it. Then he dropped his rifle and walked away down *Beit Hanina's* Main Street. The terrorist concealing shrubbery was eliminated. From time-to-time two Border Police officers were assigned guard duty at the intersection.

5. MIDNIGHT, no Border Police around, vehicle-borne terrorists strafed a lone car stopped at the intersection's traffic lights. CCTV cameras were installed in and the intersection. Border Police begin taking "in jeep" breaks in the intersection.

6. A HOMICIDE/SUICIDE BOMBER waited until the two Border Police officers on duty were at the upper end of the intersection. Then he entered the intersection from the lower end and tried to get on a bus. The bus's alert driver closed the door on him. The terrorist responded by immediately detonating the explosive garment he wore.

Three Border Police officers were permanently assigned to the intersection. They were stationed; two at the lower, busier end, one at the upper end. They began inspecting pedestrians' bags.

7. A TERRORIST standing on the curb of the *Beit Hanina* side of the intersection waited for a passenger bus to stop for the traffic light. Keeping the bus between himself and the Border Police officers on duty on the other side of the intersection, he stepped into the street, removed an M16 from a garbage bag he carried and shot-up the

stationary bus. The Border Police officers raced across the intersection and around the bus and shot him dead. We watched the CCTV video of the attack on the evening news.

A "temporary" (18 months) frail barrier was put in place to keep people from crossing from one side of the intersection to the other except through the quasi-checkpoint at the lower end of the intersection manned by the two Border Police officers. The third **officer**, assigned to the intersection's upper area, was directed to occasionally cross over to the *Beit Hanina* side.

8. A HOMICIDE/SUICIDE BOMBER crept down from the Route #1 highway overpass and hid among the piling in the upper-end of the intersection. When the Border Police officer patrolling the upper area crossed to the *Beit Hanina* side, the bomber rushed into the intersection between a bus and a two taxis and before anyone could react detonated the bomb he wore.

The number of Border Police officers assigned to guard the intersection was increased to include one permanently assigned to patrol the *Beit Hanina* side of the intersection.

9. A HOMICIDE/SUICIDE BOMBER waited on the *Beit Hanina* lower side of the intersection until the Border Police officer assigned there was patrolling the upper area. Then the bomber ran across the intersection, simply moving the temporary barrier positioned down the middle of the road out of the way. Reaching a bus loading passengers he detonated.

The Border Police redeployed and created permanent checkpoints at both the upper and lower entrances to the intersection. A metal "Watch Tower" was hoisted onto the hillside overlooking the intersection. A second Border Police officer was

permanently assigned to the *Beit Hanina* side of the intersection.

During the 12 months that followed the bus stops were separated as far apart from each other as possible and serious anti-vehicle barriers were installed. A permanent barrier was constructed down the middle of the entire length of the intersection. For some inexplicable reason, most of the time cellular phones no longer worked in the vicinity of the intersection.

10. A FEMALE HOMICIDE/SUICIDE BOMBER wearing modern Arab dress detonated the explosive device in the backpack she was wearing when she realized that the two Border Police officers on duty were moving towards her and intended to inspect her backpack before allowing her to enter the area of the bus stops. My two fellow officers were killed. A permanent, shrapnel retarding structure was put in place at the lower portion of the intersection for the use of the Border Police.

The next attack is only a matter of time. Go back and read this article again using a conceptual frame of reference. These ten attacks demonstrate escalating violence in the nature and the means employed to carry them out. Each attack focuses on defeating whatever security is present at the location, either by attacking where security is not or by surprising security. One might say it is a game of cat and mouse, but it is no game. **TFI**

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Howard Linett is an attorney, an independent journalist, a lecturer, sniper instructor in the Israeli Police Civil Guard and the author of "Living with Terrorism: Survival Lessons from the Streets of Jerusalem." Mr. Linett has a blog at www.howardlinett.com.

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- Urban Tactics Instructor





ARE YOU PREPARED FOR A RANGE EMERGENCY?

BY ERIC DICKINSON

One of the most noticeable areas neglected in firearms instructor training is preparation for a medical or traumatic emergency at the training area. For those departments with tactical emergency medical support (TEMS) personnel, this situation may be easy to handle. TEMS personnel may be present for training with their equipment and able to quickly and properly respond to an emergency. At the very least, they may be a readily accessible source for assistance in creating a proper plan, procedure and kit.

For those agencies and firearms instructors who do not have TEMS available, things may be a bit more problematic unless you plan ahead of time and prepare for such an event. As your department's firearms instructor, it is your responsibility to do everything within your power to ensure that your training is safely conducted within reasonable industry standards. But sometimes, things don't go as planned. Heart attacks and other medical conditions are a fact of life. Accidents and negligent acts happen despite our best efforts. It is imperative that you are

prepared regardless of how safe you believe your training to be. This article will focus on three main areas to help prepare you to deal with one of these emergencies should they occur.

Training

In a perfect world, every range would be staffed with experienced paramedics with a full compliment of equipment. Of course, you could spend hundreds of hours in training and clinicals and become a paramedic yourself. We all know that is not possible or realistic in most cases. Even if you decided to become a paramedic or EMT, the certification will probably do you little good without being part of a state recognized EMS agency or without the thousands of dollars in equipment that may be necessary. Instead, most officers receive a small amount of first aid training in their basic academy and do not receive any refresher training after that.

Your own agency's situation will dictate the level of first aid training and equipment that are appropriate for your agency's training program. Answer the following questions. What type of response times can you

expect for EMS to arrive at the training site? How long will transport to the appropriate hospital take? What certification levels and capabilities can you expect from your local EMS? What, if any, additional requirements must be met for department personnel to act as EMS providers?

At a minimum, all instructors should maintain current certifications in CPR / AED and basic first aid. The American Red Cross and American Heart Association offer classes that may be adequate for your needs. Those in areas with longer EMS response and transport times may justify training instructors at higher certification levels such as First Responder or Emergency Medical Technician. Don't get too carried away. A certification that teaches you how to insert an endotracheal tube or start IVs does little good if they are pieces of equipment you will never carry or be permitted to use. You would be well served to work with an EMS service on a part time or volunteer basis to gain experience and possibly receive an umbrella of protection.

In addition to basic CPR and first aid

training, seek out opportunities for instruction in related topics such as helicopter landing zone operations. Your local air medical transports probably provide training to area EMS, fire and law enforcement agencies. This training will enable you to understand landing zone requirements, procedures for operating around the helicopter, what types of patients benefit the most from helicopter transport and information the helicopter crew needs before arriving on scene. Find out if your area helicopters shut down on scene or operate a "hot" landing zone with engines and rotors still running. This makes a big difference particularly if the model helicopter used is not safe to approach while the rotors are still turning.

Pre-Planning

One of the most important things you can do before a medical emergency occurs at your training site is to network and consult with your local EMS agencies about the types of emergencies you expect. Do not get an EMT certification with no experience and expect your local EMS providers to let you tell them what to do regarding a medical emergency. You wouldn't like it if an EMT completed a criminal justice degree and tried to tell you how to make an arrest, so give them the same respect. Including them in your planning will encourage a better working relationship between your two agencies for incidents both at the training site and out on the street. Again, understand their capabilities as a service and their response and transport times. Understand that they have protocols they must follow regarding which hospitals they may or may not be allowed to transport your patient to based on time, distance and type of injury or medical problem.

When the training day arrives, save yourself and dispatch some potential headaches. Notify the dispatch center of the training

session in writing. Make sure they know when it will be occurring. Provide them with radio identification numbers and cell numbers of at least one instructor and any land line telephone number for the site. Provide the physical address of the training site. GPS coordinates may also be helpful to helicopter crews who respond to your location. List which EMS, fire and helicopter services provide coverage to that area and a general

able until they are notified that the training has concluded.

Equipment

How many times have you seen an agency or officer buy the most expensive, elaborate piece of equipment and not spend a single minute learning how to use it? Don't do the same thing with your emergency kit. The stakes are too high to simply buy a fancy pre-stocked medical kit from one of the

public safety supply catalogs on your desk. Do yourself and your students a favor. Do your research. Make informed decisions about your equipment needs and understand exactly how to use every item in your inventory. Again, if you do not have TEMS available, talk to your local EMS crews. Figure out which injuries or medical emergencies you expect to occur during your training and the type of equipment and supplies that will be most appropriate for your certification level. Most of the equipment needed for an effective kit is available for very little cost. Some EMS agencies receive a considerable bulk discount from suppliers. Consider asking them if you can purchase the needed items through them. Some manufacturers and suppliers will provide free samples of their products that you may be able to incorporate into your kit. We are not talking about outfitting your entire patrol fleet, just one or two kits. Take advantage of anything you can get for free.

For an equipment bag, a \$30-\$50 backpack with MOLLE attachment points from a discount supplier will last just as long as the \$200-\$400 brand name tactical medic bag. Use your good judgment and keep it reasonable.

This bag is going to be hanging on the wall of your facility for most of its life, not accompanying you through the mountains of Afghanistan on combat missions. The MOLLE system will allow you to add additional pouches for new supply needs over time without having to buy a new pack.

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procedure you plan to follow in the event of an emergency situation requiring a medical response. What frequency can responding EMS personnel contact you on? What are the ingress and egress routes? If a helicopter may be requested, pre-designate a landing zone and ground contact. Ask that dispatchers keep this information sheet readily avail-



following or similar items at a minimum for instructor staff trained at a basic first aid level:

- Non-latex gloves (several pair in XL so they will fit on any officer's hands)
- a pair of EMS / trauma shears
- a CPR mask
- one bottle of hand sanitizer
- a pen light or flashlight
- ten 4 x 4 gauze pads
- ten 5 x 9 (or similar) trauma dressings
- one 12 x 16 abdominal dressing
- two Asherman chest seals or other occlusive dressings
- two rolls of 2" cloth tape
- one bag valve mask
- one emergency blanket (more if operating in cold or wet conditions)
- one tourniquet
- one Automated External Defibrillator (AED)
- A map of the area, landing zones, hospital routes, etc.
- A list of EMS and hospital phone numbers
- Portable radio with frequencies that will allow you to talk directly with EMS, fire or air units.

Total cost of all the items listed, not including the AED and radio, are less than \$100 including the backpack. This is certainly an affordable expense for an agency or even an individual instructor. Items such as band-aids, antiseptic, sunburn lotion, sun block and bug spray are good to have available but are not going to be necessary in life threatening emergencies. Keep them in a separate container than the emergency kit in order to minimize opportunities for disruption of the emergency kit by other personnel. Make sure that all personnel involved in the training are aware of the exact location of the emergency kit at the start of the training session.

In addition to a primary range emergency kit, some instructors like to carry a smaller, personal kit on their person such as in a pouch on their body armor or in a cargo pocket. This personal kit can allow the instructor to provide immediate care as soon as an injury occurs while other officers retrieve the primary emergency kit. For a simple personal kit, I recommend the following small items stored in a large zipper style plastic sandwich bag:

- one Res-Cue Key CPR mask

- two 5 x 9 trauma dressings
- one tourniquet
- two pair of non-latex gloves in XL
- one pair of EMS / trauma shears
- one 2" roll of cloth tape

Each item is specifically chosen for its small size and importance while waiting for the primary kit to arrive at the patient's side. In a pinch the plastic bag could be used as an improvised occlusive dressing to treat a sucking chest wound by taping all but one corner of the plastic over the wound.

Some instructors and agencies may choose to include hemostatic agents in their range emergency kits. Do careful research if you are considering the use of these products. They are a **supplement** designed to assist when traditional forms of bleeding control are found to be ineffective. Hemostatic agents are not effective if they are not used properly and in strict adherence with the manufacturers' instructions. Personnel must be thoroughly trained and educated in their use and effects. Be cautious of distributors or sales staff who claim that any bleeding can be controlled by simply applying their product to a wound without attempting traditional methods such as direct pressure, elevation, pressure points and tourniquets.

Conclusion

The longer you serve as a firearms instructor, the greater the likelihood that one of your trainees could suffer from a medical condition or traumatic injury during your training session. By following proper safety procedures you can eliminate the opportunity for many of these events to occur. Unfortunately, bad things may still happen even though you did everything correctly and safely as an instructor. Get the proper training and equipment to respond appropriately. By preparing for a range related emergency, you demonstrate to your students that their safety and survival is truly your number one priority. **TFI**

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Eric Dickinson is a Senior Police Officer with the Vinton (IA) Police Department. He is also an EMT-Intermediate (85) and State of Iowa certified EMS-Instructor. He instructs various topics related to use of force and officer survival. He is a member of IALEFI®, ILEETA and NTOA and holds a BS in Public Administration and an AA in Criminal Justice. This is his first contribution to "The Firearms Instructor"

A black and white photograph of two men in tactical gear. The man on the left is bald and wearing a dark polo shirt and light-colored cargo pants. The man on the right is wearing a dark t-shirt with a circular logo on the back, light-colored cargo pants, and a dark cap. They are standing outdoors, possibly in a courtyard, and appear to be in conversation.

BEEN THERE?

VIP Protection, Counter Terrorism, and High Risk Zone Training at the International Security Academy - Israel

by Colin Despins

The morning air is cool as I roll out of bed and step out onto the terrazzo balcony overlooking the courtyard of the Israeli Olympic Shooting Center. I close my eyes and allow myself a few moments to reflect. I take a deep breath in realization that it's not going to last; the cool calm of 6am at the International Security Academy (ISA) in Israel.

Your welcoming committee is Mirza David. Mirza is the Founder and Executive Director of the ISA and he has personally overseen every session of training in 15 years of operation. At 8pm Mirza formerly addresses his new group of trainees. The group consists of an assortment of mostly ex-military operators from all over the world; however they are all here for the same purpose, to train in the tactics and methods of an Israeli expertise, VIP protection. "Tonight you will receive an introduction to the first and most

fundamental principal of the Israeli Method and the International Security Academy," explains Mirza.

The group is assembled in the courtyard as instructed. There is a bit of chatter between the larger than typical showing of trainees from Spain as the instructors begin to pull individuals from the group and divide us into teams. I am the sixth person picked by one of the instructors as they begin dividing us. A lesser-developed part of my brain is feeling thankful that I was picked early instead of dead last. After several more rounds of selection it becomes obvious that we are being chosen and split into teams by physical size. This realization makes me laugh at myself a bit for my rather grade school reaction to being picked early on.

My team consists of Neli, Mary, May, Ari, Jermi, Mini and myself, Desi. These are

the members of the original "ladies" team. In the Israeli training method, military or police, no matter your rank, the moment you enter into any course you become one of "the children" or one of "the girls." Each participant is given a new "girl" name and it becomes their tag for the duration of your course activities. In a very short time, the team even develops a sense of pride in their female-named group. May, our team translator, became quite fond of saying, "The ladies always win."

As a whole there were twenty-nine students in the course, fourteen of them could be said to speak passable English, seven spoke Spanish exclusively and three spoke Russian almost exclusively. The rest served as translators between their native tongue and those who spoke English. The course participants unofficially represented twelve countries. Other students joining in later weeks for courses concerning protection in high risk zones and intelligence gathering



would bring that number to almost twenty. Mirza describes this as part of the “pepper” his course offers, a special ingredient, or part of the spice.

Through the coming weeks, his students would learn how to function as a team to accomplish objectives despite language barriers. They would also discover “what’s going on” in one another’s countries. Mirza explained while pointing out members of the group, “If you want to know what’s going on in Germany, you will ask this man. If you want to know how to get things done in Bulgaria, ask him. These are advantages available to you in my course and I suggest that you take them.”

By occupation the group could be divided a bit differently. A large cross section of the group actively functioned as bodyguards, many for the private sector though some for governmental bodies. Some participants attended under sponsorship of their country, some were active military personnel and others represented various governmental agencies. Others gave brief occupational descriptions, such as businessman, consultant, or contractor. As much as this made some members of the group suspicious, the ISA does not take chances and requires a criminal background check for all participants. Not one member of the group claimed to be unemployed. This comes as no surprise given the growing demand for elite security personnel.

Israel has fought a long and hard battle against terrorism. Lessons have been learned, techniques, tactics and methods have been developed, and they have proven to work effectively. This is the reason why so many seasoned operators of mixed Military heritage turn out for instruction at the ISA. You really haven’t “been there, done that” until you have learned the methods used to fight terrorist actions from those who

live and work on the frontline of terrorist aggression. At the International Security Academy, Israel exposes you to the true climate of challenges you will face in battle. The techniques, tactics and methods they teach have been developed, devised, refined and practiced by the same individuals the ISA employs to instruct your courses. Participants in ISA courses will tell you that what brings them there is the opportunity to invest in their future, to strengthen their country in the war on terrorism or for some simply because they know it looks good on their CV. Coming to Israel to train at the ISA from places as far away as the United States and South America to learn VIP protection or protection in high risk zones from elite Israeli commandos is a bit like traveling to shaolin to learn kung-fu. But maybe that’s exactly the point.

Kris, an active contractor in Iraq claims to have logged at least 2500 non-compulsory hours of specialized private training to date, and says his primary goal in coming to the ISA to train was to increase his options in dealing with confrontation. During his nine week stay with the ISA, Kris gained more practical knowledge than he had expected. “The materials they presented to us concerning Arab/Islamic culture, Religion and manners where amazing. The Israeli perspective concerning Counter Terrorism is

unique and highly valuable.” Kris recommends, “If you come here (the ISA) to train, be in shape, be motivated and bring an open mind and clear head.”

A prime example of the ISA philosophy that Fords Gym doesn’t build VPOs (VIP Protection Operators) is Mili. I’m not implying that Mili doesn’t look the part; but rather that Mili expressed to me his realization that in this industry, one thing simply does equal another. “People who think they can simply transition from Special Forces or even an Elite Anti-Terrorism Unit into VPO work are mistaken.” Mili is currently active in the private sector and says he realizes that before the specialized training he received at the ISA he was simply an armed escort. According to Mirza David, “There are many ex-military in this field acting as bodyguards. Do you want to ‘act’ as a body guard? Because it is only acting for these types.”

The training methods of the International Security Academy – Israel are built upon the small arms doctrine of the original Israeli Counter Terrorist Unit. The methods of this unit, known as the YAMAM (a Hebrew acronym for special police unit), where honed on the front lines of counter terrorism operations over decades of conflict. The methods are simple, effective and most importantly they teach you how to transform your natural reactions into proactive responses. Another element of the ISA method of instruction is stress. Stress is induced in a number of ways and is both physical and mental. Physically the ISA instruction team grants you little time to rest yet confidently allows you just enough to survive the day’s heat and exercises. Mentally the instructors shock you buy yelling unanticipated commands while told to “be ready” to execute a different task, all this combined with physical shock elements at the same time. If you execute



the task well you are rewarded with a kick in the stomach, punch in the kidney, or aggressive slap on the back. "Good," "steady," and "stay strong," followed by ZAP, POW, BANG. Many a satisfied customer's initial comments might sound something like "this is punishment," or, "I did this brutal sh#@ when I was 18". Mirza doesn't care when or where his trainees believe they "cut their teeth." They still have to earn his diploma, and to do so, they must prove they have the metal, both physically and mentally. This is the core of Mirza's philosophy, and it's the reason why he has an international reputation for producing some of the finest operators in the industry. Mirza's reputation spans from Honduras to Latvia, from the Saudi Royal Family to Moscow and from Kenya to Tokyo.

The instruction team members of the ISA are the finest examples the Israeli security establishment has to offer. For the western ear, names like Shabak, Yamam, Mossad, Shin Bet, Sayeret, or Mistarvim only lend to confusion. Often it becomes necessary to check the spelling, consult an expert or read a book simply to discover the relationship between these organizations. There are plenty of Israelis ready to "train you," and they are banking on potential participants being impressed by such terminology. Mirza's organization does not stand on such weak foundation. For example, Chief Instructor Zafir Pazi has 25 years with the Israeli Secret Service and has provided close protection services for Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Shamir, Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon. These aren't coy claims, and you can

view the photographs on the International Security Academy - Israel website.

What I can tell you personally from my experience with the ISA is that the training they offer will surprise and challenge you. There are times when you will feel confused, lost and even defeated. Some will lead, others will follow and a few will even be dragged to the finish line but all will leave with a sense of pride and accomplishment in realization that they elevated themselves and their abilities in the time they spent with the International Security Academy - Israel.

I would not only like to extend my gratitude to the entire ISA Team, and a special thanks to Mirza David, Zafir Pazi, Daron "be ready" Balhansan and Avi Katz, but also give extra special thanks to "the ladies team." What can I say? "The ladies always win!" **TFI**

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STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

BY BANK MILLER

As a Range Master or Lead Firearms Instructor maintaining the integrity and overall operation of your range and training facility is of paramount importance.

Without guidelines or procedures in place, you can imagine (and in many cases, know) what will happen to your range without direction. Many ranges have had a considerable amount of damage done due to misuse, lack of responsibility, and a “just don’t care” attitude.

While all ranges (including a shoot house) should have standard operating procedures (SOPs) in place for each, this article will cover only the SOP for a rifle range. I chose to write the rifle range SOP due to its flexibility.

Please read the following SOP for a rifle range. Note that it is not intended to be an all in all, as location, environment, and management varies from location to location. If you chose to use it, change its content to fit your needs and consideration.

However, I do suggest anyone using your range facility should read and sign the SOP.

With the liability concerns in today’s environment this may protect you and your agency as well as help you maintain the integrity of your range for safe operations.

All SOPs should be signed by the lead instructor using your range, and kept on file until they sign another one.

If this SOP is well received, I plan on following up with one on a shoot house in the

near future.

If you have any input you would like to share or questions, please contact me at bankm@actiontarget.com.

Be safe and train for life! **TFI**

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Bank Miller is presently the Director of Training for the Action Target Academy. Bank has over 28 years of Federal law enforcement experience and was Chief Firearms Instructor for the Drug Enforcement Administration. Bank was Director of Training at the SIGARMS Academy for 13 years before retiring.

ACTION TARGET ACADEMY STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE #01-2 RIFLE RANGE

Types of Permissible Firearms:

1. Pistol/Revolver/Shotgun/Rifle/SMG/Less Lethal (except chemical munitions)
2. Sniper Rifle (only weapons system that can be used beyond the 100 yard line)

Ammunition Types That Can Be Used:

1. Any factory new ammunition with the exception of military type “green tip” ammunition (62 grain steel penetrator/M855 ball).
2. Any reloaded ammunition provided it is made from once fired brass and was sold by a reputable manufacturer who

sold this ammunition as part of a law enforcement contract.

Range Supplies:

1. Agencies using the range must bring all of their own targets, spray paint and other range supplies. Target stands and barricades will be provided.

Safety Equipment and Procedures:

1. All personnel on the facility, whether training or not, will have a billed type baseball hat, double hearing protection (ear plugs and muffs, to a total of at least 29db protection) and wraparound, non-shattering eye protection.
2. There are no safety items or range supplies available for loan

from the Action Target Academy so these items must be brought to the range by the renting agency.

3. Safety Rules will be followed in accordance with the Firearms Safety Sheet (separate).
4. Training cannot begin until all personnel have been both briefed by the designated range officer from their organization and the forms have been completed and turned in to a Action Target Academy staff member.

Clean Up and Turn-In:

1. Trash Removal - Renting Agency should put all old targets, trash, pieces of wood and residue from firing, and other refuse (including shotgun wads) in trash bags and place it in the dumpster at the main Academy building prior to leaving the facility. Do not use the trash cans or any other type of receptacle at the range.
2. Brass Removal - Brass must be removed completely from the facility.
3. Restroom usage - Only the restrooms in the main Academy building will be used.
4. Gates - Close all three (3) gates that lead to the rifle range when leaving the facility.

Parking:

When using the downrange area (forward of 100 yards) for training, only 1 vehicle will be allowed past the Y intersection. This is for use to haul supplies and equipment to the downrange area. Vehicles cannot park on or turn around on the road that runs parallel to the rifle range.

Location of Target Stands:

Target stands can be brought back no farther than the edges of the backstop. This is approximately 15 yards from the backstop itself. Only barricades that will be used for cover can be placed past this point. Do not at any time place a target stand for any reason past the sand covered area.

Steel Targets:

These may only be used with handguns. There will be no firing on any steel targets with frangible ammunition closer than three (3) yards. If firing handguns the ammunition can be jacketed/leaded ammunition, but all shooters must be at least 15 yards from the targets, the targets must be properly set up and all personnel on the range back to 300 yards must be wearing wraparound eye protection meeting ANSI specifications. Wearers of prescription eyeglasses must have side shields and it is recommended that they have additional eye coverage. If using SMG's and pistol caliber carbines, they must be fired from no closer than 15 yards and using frangible ammunition only. Rifles may never be fired on steel at any time on this range regardless of the situation. In addition, the instructors should ensure that observers are positioned safely in regards to the steel (behind the shooter and no more that 30 degrees left or right of the shooter).

Angles of Fire/Direction of Fire:

When placing target stands, the range officer or instructor should ensure that there is no potential for a round not hitting the backstop. This will require that the instructor physically go to each target and from the head area to foot of the target, and from all distances that the target could be fired at, verify that the angle of fire is safe, left, right and up.

Barricades:

There are some barricades on the range that can be used by renting agencies, but those cannot be used as target stands and must be replaced in the designated area for them prior to leaving. Areas that are shot on the edges of these are not a concern, but anything used as a cover item should be able to let a round pass through readily (this does not include wooden 2" x 4"s used to hold up targets or barricades).

Static Courses of Fire:

1. 16-20 personnel on line at one time (provided instructor ratio is suitable).
2. For rifle drills (prone)-may have as many as 32 personnel on line at one time when conducting prone shooting at 100, 200, or 300 yards provided that there is a proper safety officer / student ratio.
3. Do not allow holstering while in any position other than standing (do not holster when in kneeling, sitting or prone).
4. Position shooting drills-all shooters must always be in the same shooting position at all times (do not allow shooters to be in various heights of positions such as prone and standing at the same time on the same line).
5. Shooting beyond 100 yards - must physically block the road leading to the ranges with a vehicle. The Range Master must call a cease-fire immediately if someone is seen moving beyond this point.

Tactical Courses of Fire:

1. 1-5 personnel conducting these maximum (depending upon the type of course of fire)
2. Both corners of the backstop may be used simultaneously but only when there is no chance of a crossfire and when there is no chance that the direction of fire left or right does not turn more than 45 degrees or run the risk of missing the berm.
3. Movement drills are allowed and certainly encouraged, but the instructor conducting these should have a thorough knowledge of how to teach the technique as well as proper coaching position and methods of such drills.
4. Double check angles of fire as well as directions of fire (from all shooting positions and barricades at all targets and aiming points on those targets). If there are any questions on this issue, please contact the Academy.

Special Props on the Range:

Any of these that are not designated in advance as either target stands or barricades will not be touched or moved in any way (many are needed for specialized courses).

Picnic Tables and Benches:

These should be removed from the firing area of the range and placed in the designated areas of the range prior to departure.

Academy Building:

The break room, cleaning room and office areas of the Action Target Academy are off limits to personnel using the outdoor ranges (including the upper deck range). Any users of these facilities should keep in mind that there are Academy courses and business operations ongoing that cannot be interrupted.

Range Masters/Instructors:

It is highly recommended that agencies using the Action Target Academy facilities have at least one instructor attend one of the following courses: Tactical Handgun Instructor, Patrol Rifle / Carbine Instructor or Range Master as these contain many elements of proper range conduct and utilization.

Academy Staff:

Prior to leasing agency's arrival:

1. Locate remote control units and test. (They require 9 volt batteries - replace if necessary.)
2. Purge air lines by opening valve located in the cleaning room and observing vented air outside of side door. Leave valve open until all moisture has been purged from the line, then shut valve.

Academy Staff and Leasing Agency Primary Instructor:

Conduct a walk-through inspection prior to using range - check:

1. Target faces. If any target is pitted or has holes in it, lay it down on the ground so it cannot be used.
2. Air lines and couplings. Ensure that there are no breaks, cracks, or leaks.
3. Backstop and blacktop area. Ensure that there is no material on the backstop or blacktop area that may pose a safety hazard (trash, debris, etc.).
4. Academy staff demonstrates correct use of remote control to Leasing Agency Primary Instructor. Note that:

- a. Remote control must be in a direct (unblocked) line of sight with the receiver located next to the side door.
- b. Emphasize that before firing on the resetting targets, the remote control must be pressed a second time until the air in the rest pistons is purged. There should be a loud hissing noise when this happens. **DO NOT FIRE AT THE RESETTING TARGETS UNTIL THE PISTONS HAVE BEEN PURGED!**

Leasing Agency Primary Instructor:

The Leasing Agency Primary Instructor is responsible for ensuring that only non-toxic, lead free frangible ammunition is used on the steel reactive target range. If you have any doubts about what type of ammo to use, ask an Academy staff member.

IF ANY LEAD AMMO IS FIRED, THE LEASING AGENCY WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR REPLACEMENT OF ANY DAMAGED TARGETS, REMOVAL OF ALL CONTAMINATED MATERIAL, AND RESTORATION OF THE RANGE TO ITS ORIGINAL CONDITION.

Upon Completion of Shooting:

Academy Staff and Leasing Agency Primary Instructor will conduct a second walk through inspection, ensuring that:

1. No targets, hose, or couplings have been damaged;
2. All resetting targets reset, purge, and fall normally;
3. All brass and other debris (ammo boxes, targets, etc.) have been picked up and disposed of properly.



Officer Steve Wietrzykowski
Ludington, MI Police Department

LESSONS LEARNED

FIREFIGHT AT MANLEY

BY JEFF HALL

Michael Alan Silka had left a trail of bodies in his wake. Now the troopers on his trail were about to discover that good plans don't always survive contact with the enemy.

The Bell Jet Ranger lifted off the grass of the runway at Manley Hot Springs, Alaska. Tom Davis, the pilot, was a two-tour Vietnam combat pilot. Captain Don Lawrence, the "E" detachment commander, sat in the right rear.

The left-side doors of the helicopter had been removed. Trooper Troy Duncan sat in the left rear seat, feet on the skid, facing outboard, and I was in the left front, similarly seated. We both wore seat harnesses and were tethered to a hard point on the floor. Troy was armed with a Colt M16A1 with a Colt 3X scope; I had an M16A1 with iron

sights. Both guns held 20 round magazines loaded with tracer rounds. We also carried two handguns each and the usual SWAT team gear.

The second helicopter carried Trooper Dave Hamilton and Lieutenant John Meyers, the SERT team leader. Dave carried a Steyr SSG with a 6X scope. The Lt. had an M16.

A TRAIL OF BODIES

The SERT team was searching for Michael Alan Silka. Silka had killed a man named Roger Culp two months earlier. The prior day, May 18, 1984, Silka had also killed six residents of Manley Hot Springs; his victims

included a two year-old boy, a pregnant woman, and four men. He also killed a trapper, Fred Burke, who had the misfortune of encountering Silka while traveling down the river. Silka was also suspected of killing two women in Canada and a man in North Dakota, and two passengers seen in his vehicle were never located. Silka had camped at Manley, waiting for the ice to go out on the river. His plan was to become a trapper in the wilderness west of Denali National Park.

We had been searching for Silka since 0300 that morning. The troopers had sent

several fixed wings and two helicopters to search an area of 50,000 square miles. Silka was believed to have gone up the Tanana River to the Zitziana (the "Zit") River; his plan was to go up the Zit to establish a trapping cabin.

One complication we encountered was the recent opening of the spring bear season; the normally empty area was full of hunters, all of whom had to be identified and cleared. We had spent the day landing near hunting camps and flying the rivers, looking for Silka's canoe. Two Fish and Wildlife troopers had spotted his canoe thirty miles from Manley, headed up the Zit.

A GOOD PLAN MEETS REALITY

A plan is just a list of things that aren't going to happen. Our plan was to put a sniper on the ground upriver from Silka. As he approached the sniper, the two helicopters would converge, with Silka facing troopers in three directions. Our operational order, given by the Lt., was to shoot him if he did *anything* other than stop and put his hands in the air.

As we proceeded, the second helo diverted to check a man standing on the bank of the river. We spotted the canoe, tethered behind Fred Burke's riverboat, tied to a tree in a slough off the river. Destiny showed her face, putting the only open landing zone within miles directly in front of Silka's position. We saw Silka bend over and reach for something in the boat as we flew over and turned into the wind to land.

The helicopter began its descent, coming into ground effect. I yelled over the radio for Tom to get us up, out of the landing zone, because Silka had a good position below a dirt bank and behind three trees. As we traded kerosene for altitude, Silka attacked.

As I write this, I can see the sunlight reflect off the stock of his rifle as he swung toward us.

Silka, Troy, and I all fired at the same time. Troy fired three shots, I fired a burst of eight or nine, and Silka his first shot. He was using a Ruger #1, single shot, in 30-06.

Silka fired again, hitting Troy in the neck. I fired another burst, hitting Silka eight times in the legs, body and head. Both Troy and Silka died instantly. Capt. Lawrence was hit in the face from fragments of the bullet that had killed Troy. I figure the entire shooting lasted two seconds—25 rounds fired, two dead, one wounded, two seconds.

After plans, the second thing to fall apart is communication. The net was instantly slammed with everyone talking at once. The

"WHETHER YOUR OPPONENT IS A FORMER RANGER ... OR A FAT KID ON A SKATEBOARD WITH A .22, THE MOST DANGEROUS OPPONENT YOU HAVE IS THE ONE IN FRONT OF YOU."

captain declared a medical emergency and ordered Tom to break off. I turned to look in the rear seat and realized that the red stuff all over me was Troy. We headed for Manley, leaving the second helicopter to land and deal with Silka.

They knew shots had been fired but nothing else. They ventured into the unknown; Dave threw the SSG into the brush and drew his handgun, given the range of fifteen yards. The Lt. covered him with the M16 as they approached Silka's position, where they found him dead.

LESSONS FROM THE SHOOTING AT MANLEY HOT SPRINGS

We underestimated our opponent! All of us on the SERT team were military veterans, many with Vietnam combat experience. We had black clothing, Velcro, ballistic nylon, machine guns, helicopters, and were SWAT guys. Silka was "just some **** from Chicago"; he'd crumble when we showed up. The problem was that Silka wasn't impressed. He was a dead shot, was in tremendous physical shape, and was motivated—he had nothing to lose. Whether your opponent is a former Ranger and U.F.C. champion or a fat kid on a skateboard with a .22, the most dangerous opponent you have is the one in front of you.

We lacked essential equipment. We didn't have noise flash devices at the time. As Hamilton (one of the finest shots, with any weapon, that I know) approached, a couple of flash-bangs thrown into Silka's position would have been a beautiful thing; gas or smoke would also have been options, but we weren't carrying either.

Snipers need a good back-up weapon. SWAT situations are usually fluid, dynamic, chaotic situations that change rapidly. As at Manley, your sniper may suddenly be the point man or rear guard. He should have a

good SMG or similar weapon available when the plan falls apart

We need to train. I was fortunate that I've spent a lot of time shooting from helicopters. In addition to military experience, I'd been doing a testing and evaluation on patrol rifles. I'd had recent opportunities to shoot a lot from moving helicopters, taking a test rifle with me on every flight we made. There are *lots* of empty sand bars on the rivers in Alaska, no one around, and it was no big deal to shoot a few magazines at targets of opportunity. That, and a huge dose of luck, is why I'm alive.

The Massachusetts State Police realized the need for this type of training and had me put on a class for them.

There are no shortcuts! You can't buy a video, or a book, or a piece of gear that will replace good-quality training. To prevail in combat, you have to train, *hard*, under a good instructor. When I look for training, I go to folks who have won fights. I started under my father, a three-war, eight-Purple Heart veteran. Later, I trained under Jeff Cooper, Chuck Taylor and Clint Smith. I'm training under Steve Jimerfield of One-on-One Control Tactics to improve my ground-fighting ability. I'm planning future tutoring by Scott Reitz, Pat Rodgers and Louie Awerbuck. Good, hard training is the only way most of us can prepare for the next fight.

You must KNOW your equipment. When the bolt locked back on my M16, I felt it and heard it. I pushed the magazine release, inserted a new mag, and hit the bolt release, chambering a new round. I did not think about the process—it just happened. In Japanese, it's called "mushin"—literally "no mind" or "without conscious thought." If you're a member of the gun-of-the-month club, changing guns when you change under-

"A PLAN IS JUST A LIST OF THINGS THAT AREN'T GOING TO HAPPEN. OUR PLAN WAS TO PUT A SNIPER ON THE GROUND UPRIVER FROM SILKA."

wear, you'll have to think about how to work the gun in a fight. The time it takes to think about it can get you killed.

You have to be willing. This is critical! You can be a four-weapon combat master and multiple black-belt triathlon winner, but if you lack the will, you'll lose. I don't mean that you *want* to shoot someone (we call these folks sociopaths and usually don't hire them), just that you are willing to do it if needed. It is not surprising that police departments are finding that a small percentage of their officers are involved in a majority of shootings. This is not a bad thing—it's a realization that prior shootings inoculate the officer against the fear and stigma of

violating one of society's main taboos. If you shoot someone, the world doesn't end—you'll get through it and realize it may be OK to shoot people. As Clint Smith says, "Some people just need to be shot."

We actually got off easy at Manley. Had we landed, we would probably all have been shot. Silka would have grabbed his ruck and escaped into the wilderness. As other troopers closed in, he'd have set up a hasty ambush and killed a trooper, run, repeated until captured or killed. The loss of Troy was bad, but we got off cheap.

I ask you to take these hard-won lessons to heart. It doesn't matter if you're a police officer, soldier, martial artist, or private

citizen, follow this advice: As Thucydides said, "He is best who trains in the severest school." It was true 3,000 years ago, and it's true today. **TFI**

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jeff Hall is a retired lieutenant from the Alaska State Troopers. Over his twenty-year career, he served in patrol, traffic, narcotics, major crimes, and a one-man "bush" post. He served in all areas of the state, spent eleven years on statewide S.E.R.T., eight years on the Tactical Dive Unit, and nineteen years on the state pistol team.

Retiring in 1998, Hall joined the NRA/LEAD training unit, teaching law enforcement courses nationwide. Hall works for several state P.O.S.T.'s and as a private trainer, consultant, and expert witness in use-of-force issues. He teaches nationally, internationally, and presents each year at IALEFI®. He is a POST-certified Master Instructor in firearms and defensive tactics.

Hall has spent thirty-five years in the martial arts. He holds rank from 1st to 4th dan in four arts, and is the founder ("soke") and tenth dan in Hojutsu-Ryu, the martial art of shooting. He is an NRA Distinguished Master and Handgun Combat Master.

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IS COMBAT EXPERIENCE NECESSARY TO BE AN EFFECTIVE FIREARMS INSTRUCTOR?

by Mike Baum

I am a military Combat Arms Instructor with a little over 10 years of experience in teaching the use of firearms to both military personnel and civilians. Recently, an issue developed that I do not see getting a lot of attention in the various publications available and I thought I would submit this to you and would greatly appreciate any response you have to this article.

I was a professional Combat Arms Instructor for the military (let's leave it vague as to not offend the guilty parties) and recently I was asked to re-enlist with a unit as an instructor/gunsmith. With this new reserve assignment, I would have the pleasure of continuing my education at various training facilities to bring me up to speed on systems that were compatible with the unit's specialized missions.

As my new boss and I discussed various schools and their merits, I suggested attending the classes offered by a very well known instructor whom I have never met but respect through his writings. The NCOIC immediately shot my suggestion down because the instructor in question was, "Just a reserve cop." I thought about that for a minute and then, in my usual tactful way (which has caused members of the State Department to become nauseous in the past) informed my new boss as to why I thought he was wrong.

He responded with a gesture that told me I "was #1" in his book and that the subject was closed for debate.

However, the point in question still bothered me for a number of reasons. First of all, I had no combat experience either. If I was not qualified, why was I there? Yes, I had convinced a couple of people that I could and would make them play catch with my ammo but they had surrendered before that unfortunate option became necessary.

Common sense can be a much more valuable commodity than limited experience. I have worked with SEAL Team members in the past who were very honest with me – they spent their entire time on the Teams running up and down a beach while singing cadence and deploying to "friendly" countries, teaching basic infantry tactics to local forces. I can assure you that some of them knew a lot less than I do about weapons but had the instant credibility because they were SEALs. **The instant credibility I do give them is their outstanding professionalism and unwillingness to quit.*

The third problem is that you get guys who are great at their job but they could not teach it to save their lives. A good instructor is patient, approachable and respectful. That's a tough combination and frankly, there have been days when I can not begin

to master all of those skills before having my morning coffee. (OK, you can't have an ego either.)

The fourth and final problem is this; combat is not the norm for most people. It drives me insane when someone puffs out their chest and says, "I was there, man." Great, you may have been "there" but that doesn't mean you played dodge ball with bullets. Less than 10% of the personnel who saw service in Vietnam were attached to combat units. Even if you were lucky enough to survive, it doesn't mean you learned anything from the experience. Some folks never learn, others take the incident to heart and analyze it to death. The latter have the potential of being great instructors in the footsteps of Bill Jordan.

Weapons skills are like any other skills, the deeper your theoretical knowledge, the more adaptable you are to the situation you find yourself in. I humbly submit that while no school of thought has all the answers, all have a piece of the puzzle. Good instructors should always be searching for the next piece of the puzzle. Spend less time worrying about how much time an instructor has spent polishing their resume and more time considering the wisdom of what they are offering their students. **TFI**

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
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